CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND TENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Antonio de Icaza (Mexico)

GE.95-62379 (E)

(Mr. Schenk, Slovakia)

We do believe that the results of the recently concluded review and extension Conference will have a positive impact on the negotiations of the Conference on Disarmament on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices. Such treaties should be considered as a matter of urgency in practical applications of the outcome of that conference.

The progress that has been achieved during the negotiations on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests was an important prerequisite of the decision of States to extend the NPT. From this point of view the Slovak Republic considers the CTBT to be one of the most important issues the Conference on Disarmament is dealing with. The Slovak Republic is in favour of concluding a treaty which would outlaw all nuclear-weapon tests without exception and forever. We do believe that the remaining political issues will be settled in an expeditious manner in order to narrow the existing gaps and enable the completion of CTBT at the latest in the year 1996.

Besides the CTBT the question of a treaty banning fissile materials production for weapons and other nuclear explosive devices is regarded by the Slovak Republic as the most important issue of the Conference on Disarmament. The Slovak Republic supported the idea that the forum to contemplate this issue should be the Conference on Disarmament. In this sense we are in favour of an early start to negotiations based on the so-called simple mandate, to which framework has been constituted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L. By the same token, a future possibility to widen the perception of the matter in order to cover existing stockpiles should not be excluded.

The Slovak Republic welcomed recent declarations of the nuclear Powers to provide the non-nuclear States with guarantees against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons, together with the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 984. We do believe that these intentions shall find their reflection in an appropriate international legal instrument.

The Slovak Republic has also greeted the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and their voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons. We have noticed with satisfaction the contribution of the above-mentioned countries to nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of both regional and global security.

The termination of the cold war and the reduction of the nuclear threat made possible an important redistribution of the international public's attention. Besides nuclear arms, the issue of conventional weapons has become a high priority. The excessive accumulation of conventional weapons keeps causing innumerable economic losses and horrendous human suffering. That is why the Slovak Republic is of the opinion that it is of the highest importance to pay due attention to the issue of conventional weapons' transparency and reduction. The Slovak Republic fully supports a further strengthening of the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms and its amendment comprising

(Mr. Schenk, Slovakia)

to an unprecedented low level. This step is considered to be the best sign of our sincere attempt to contribute effectively to efforts of the international community to achieve universal and complex disarmament. We have also reduced our conventional arms holdings and personnel strength of the armed forces. Within OSCE we made public information on the organizational structure and the size of the Slovak armed forces. We co-sponsored the United Nations resolution on the export of anti-personnel land-mines and immediately, in April 1994, the Slovak Government declared a comprehensive moratorium on the export of all types of land-mines.

Relating to what has so far been said and known, we find it necessary to stress that up till now on every conceivable occasion the Slovak Republic has undoubtedly proved its ability to successfully employ the policy of consensus. It is all the more astonishing that despite the relative simplicity of the problem the member States of the Conference on Disarmament have not yet come to an appropriate solution of Slovak membership in the Conference, which has been supported by a great number of States, including the Czech Republic. At this stage I should like to convey our gratitude to all States that have supported the Slovak request. Your support will never be forgotten. On the other hand, I have to say that we feel embarrassed assuming that the failure to grant membership to the Slovak Republic has not resulted out of a fair attempt to solve the problem but, instead, a political trade-off has prevailed. We believe that the present situation does not fall in full conformity with the spirit of the period and the nature of the Conference. Otherwise, the ethical point of view would have determined a solution of an unambiguous character. Let me point out again that Slovakia has in fact always been an integral part of the Conference through the participation in international activities of the former Czecho-Slovakia. Thus only full-fledged membership in the Conference would create the conditions for the Slovak Republic to actively contribute to the previously experienced and mutually beneficial extent. By the admission of the Slovak Republic, the Conference would gain another valuable member who once belonged to the founders of this distinguished organization.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Slovakia for his statement as well as for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ambassador Ri Tcheul.

Mr. RI (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Mr. President, at the outset, I would like to extend my warm congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency in the Conference on Disarmament this month. I am convinced that your able leadership will contribute to making fresh progress in the current session.

This year marks never-be-forgettable 50th year, the year of end of holocaust sweeping the world. The number 50 reminds all of us of war and peace and at the same time, it makes us feel strong the necessity for the security for a nation, the world as well as for ourselves.

(Mr. Ri, Democratic People's Republic of Korea)

At present, there exists no practical ground for "United Nations Command" in south Korea in that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States have agreed to sever the hostile relations and our country has become a member in the United Nations.

It was long ago that "United Nations Command" should have been dissolved.

"United Nations Command" in south Korea should immediately be dissolved in accordance with the United Nations resolution and the relations be normalized between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States.

The significant global disarmament largely depends on the nuclear disarmament and abolition of nuclear weapons.

My Government and people strongly oppose nuclear weapons as they are surrounded by nuclear Powers and threatened by 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in south Korea nearly 40 years.

Accordingly, my Government made a proposal to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone and did its best for its realization.

The historic Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States Agreed Framework made last year provided the way to ward off deep-rooted nuclear threat and remove "nuclear suspicion" imposed on us, thereby shaping the prospect for fundamentally resolving nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

Agreement reached in Kuala Lumpur on 15 June between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States made it possible to do away with stumbling-block in the way of implementing the Agreed Framework and clearly reconfirmed the responsibility and duty of the parties.

The course of nuclear solution between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States explained that even a very grave issue raised in the hostility could come to political solution through negotiation ahead of confidence-building.

When we look forward to the completion of the comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1996, a dangerous tendency is growing among the nuclear power States. This is greatly disappointing the international community.

The recent decision by France of resuming nuclear test is unanimously protested and condemned, which clearly shows how strong is the demand of the international community for the nuclear disarmament.

The arbitrary practice on the part of a great Power like France who denies the majority's demand to stop nuclear tests constitutes great concern and fear by humankind. We cannot but concern through this kind of behaviour that they do, at any time, not hesitate to take any action if they deem it necessary.

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

Treaty. The fact is that this decision forms part of the package, comprising three decisions. They are decisions on the extension of the Treaty, on strengthening the review process and on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, respectively. The decision on principles and objectives clearly states, among other things, that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirm their commitments to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament, and that these States pursue with determination systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons: that the CD complete negotiations on a CTBT not later than 1996; that the CD immediately commence and achieve an early conclusion of a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; that further steps be considered to assure non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWSs) parties to the NPT against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and that these steps could take the form of an internationally and legally binding instrument; and that every effort be made by all States parties to achieve the objective of universality of the membership of the Treaty.

Undoubtedly, these are very important and solemn commitments by the States parties, particularly by the NWSs. It is imperative that the NWSs honour in letter and spirit these commitments, contained in the principles and objectives adopted by the Conference.

We believe that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament are like two sides of the same coin, and are interrelated. We cannot conceive an effective regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons without the effective implementation of concrete measures for nuclear disarmament. In the aftermath of the historic NPT review and extension Conference, it is therefore incumbent on the NWSs to display their greater political will by exercising maximum flexibility both in the context of pursuing the NPT follow-up measures, and in the ongoing negotiations in the CD.

In my statement in the plenary of the CD on 16 February last, I advocated the option of extending the NPT for rolling fixed periods with an automatic renewal mechanism and a strong review procedure. We did so, because we believe that such an option is more supportive of nuclear disarmament, and is more likely to induce greater political will on the part of the NWSs to move forward in multilateral negotiations on nuclear issues. Now that the Treaty has been extended indefinitely, there appears to be even a lesser degree of flexibility, displayed by NWSs in these negotiations. The aforementioned point of view taken by my delegation has now been proven to be correct by the stances espoused by the NWSs in the post-NPT-Conference period. But these nuclear disarmament issues are of immense importance; and the larger interests of the security of the international community are at stake. I should therefore like to urge the NWSs to exercise greater flexibility in these negotiations in the CD in the larger interests of the international community, which are indeed also consistent with their own national interests.

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

In the aftermath of the NPT review and extension Conference, there are three crucial tests for the political commitments of the NWSs: they are CTBT, nuclear disarmament and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The negotiating stances taken by the NWSs in the CD on these questions will clearly mirror the depth and seriousness of their commitments on these issues. In the light of the above, the question of nuclear disarmament has now assumed greater importance. It is indeed high time that the CD commence its substantive work on this question. As such, my delegation wishes to call for the speedy establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. The very minimum we should like to have on nuclear disarmament is the appointment of a special coordinator. He can thus be entrusted with the task of carrying out consultations on a possible draft mandate, and the necessary preparatory work with a view to establishing the ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament at the beginning of the 1996 session.

Another question that has acquired a high degree of maturity for serious negotiations is that of security assurances for NNWSs. We urge that the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons be re-established as a high priority to carry forward its work.

Resolution 984 of the United Nations Security Council and the unilateral declarations made in April by the NWSs on security assurances constitute significant steps in the right direction. It is the first time that all NWSs have collectively accorded security assurances in a United Nations Security Council resolution. Notwithstanding these significant steps, my delegation feels that they have not gone far enough for the following reasons. First, they lack a legally binding character. Resolution 984 could have a positive impact on the crystallization of an international legal norm banning the use of nuclear weapons against NNWSs, were it crafted in such a way as to create a new legal norm in this respect. But resolution 984 is not tailored to meet this requirement. Second, there is not much substance in them, for they are not comprehensive enough in scope to satisfy the concerns of NNWSs. Third, they are not multilaterally negotiated. It is essential that international legal instrument or instruments on security assurances be multilaterally negotiated to ensure that they fully meet the requirements of the NNWSs, and that they are not subject to unilateral denunciation or withdrawal by the NWSs. For these reasons, there still exists an urgent need to conclude a legally binding international instrument on security assurances. Such an instrument should cover both negative and positive assurances. We must stress here, however, that it is negative security assurances that are of primary importance. Any legal instrument - or for that matter any resolution - on security assurances that is weak in negative security aspects like the United Nations Security Council's resolution 984 will be of limited value only.

Our immediate objective in seeking legally binding security assurances is to create a powerful international legal norm banning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against NNWSs. Our ultimate objective in this regard is to

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

put in place eventually an international legal regime of no first use of, and a total ban on the use of nuclear weapons. These measures constitute important steps in the process of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons, which contributes to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, and prevention of nuclear war. These measures, including NSAs, will thereby contribute towards the enhancement of international security, while also serving regional and national security interests of all States.

My delegation believes that we can pursue two parallel courses of action in this respect. The first is to pursue negotiations on security assurances in the CD, and the second is to pursue these negotiations in the context of the NPT. We should take up this question at the meetings of the Preparatory Committee of the next NTP review Conference, and should pursue it further at a conference of States parties to the NPT, to be convened at an appropriate date thereafter for the specific purpose of addressing this question.

I would like to express the deep appreciation of my delegation to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, Ambassador Dembinski of Poland, Chairman of the Working Group I, Ambassador Norberg of Sweden, Chairman of the Working Group II, Ambassador Ramaker of the Netherlands, and the Friends of the Chair for their untiring efforts to carry forward the CTBT negotiations. Much as we have advanced so far in the CTBT negotiations, the amount of work that lies ahead is substantial; we need to step up the momentum of negotiations considerably, if the target time-frame of 1996 set by the NPT Conference is to be met. There remain several outstanding substantive issues, yet to be resolved, such as the issues of scope, organization, entry into force and some verification provisions.

One of the most crucial outstanding issues before the Ad Hoc Committee is that of the scope of the future treaty. There have been disturbing reports that discussions have been going on in certain quarters to set a certain threshold of nuclear tests to be permitted under the future CTBT. If conduct of such low-threshold nuclear tests were to be allowed under the future treaty, I am afraid that we are going to end up with another partial threshold test-ban Treaty. This is not what we want and what we are striving for. We require a truly comprehensive test-ban treaty, banning all nuclear-test explosions in all environments for all time, and no less.

Bearing this in mind, we believe that the scope of the future treaty should clearly set out that each State party undertakes not to carry out nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion at any place, to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control, and to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion at any place. Such a comprehensive scope will provide a basis for achieving an agreed text on this crucial issue.

(Mr. Aye, Myanmar)

Some three months have already elapsed since the CD established the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prohibition of Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and other Explosive Devices. We should like to see the immediate commencement of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. The Group of 21 has provided a most appropriate candidate to chair the Ad Hoc Committee.

Transparency in armaments is a relatively new issue, introduced into the CD just over two years ago. The CD had an Ad Hoc Committee working on this issue in 1993 and 1994. The mandate or the basis for the CD to carry out its work on TIA, emanating from United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36/L, has been exhausted. Resolution 49/75/C, adopted at the forty-ninth United Nations General Assembly, does not renew this mandate; nor does it bestow any specific task to the CD. Hence, we have a new situation with regard to TIA. We must therefore take a fresh look at this issue.

We have frequently heard some views to the effect that the CD ought to have an ad hoc committee on TIA in order to balance nuclear items on the active agenda of the CD with an item on conventional arms control. We do not share such views for two reasons. First, the Final Document of SSOD-I, which may well be characterized as the most significant document for multilateral disarmament efforts, rightly accorded priority to nuclear issues. Such assignment of priority is still valid today, and should be maintained. Second, TIA covers the whole spectrum of weapons of mass destruction, and is not related exclusively to conventional arms. If the aim is to balance the CD agenda with a new item on conventional weapons, TIA is not the right answer. Finding the right subject in this respect is crucially important. We shall certainly need to reflect more on it.

We are now almost two thirds of the way through this year's current session. We have only one Ad Hoc Committee functioning; there still remain several outstanding issues before us. We admire your great efforts, Mr. President, to resolve these outstanding issues through Presidential open-ended informal consultations, in addition to your regular rounds of consultations. We hope that, with your guidance and diplomatic skills, you will be able to make good progress in your endeavour.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Myanmar for his statement, as well as the kind words addressed to me and his perhaps excessive confidence in the presidency. I now call on the representative of India, Ambassador Chandra.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): Mr. President, since this is the first occasion on which I am taking the floor under your presidency I would at the outset like to congratulate you on your assumption of this important office. My delegation is particularly glad to see you in the Chair at this crucial stage in the work of the CD given your country's well-known commitment to the cause of disarmament and to the signal contributions made in this regard by your illustrious predecessors, in particular Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch. We have full confidence that the work of the CD will progress well under your able guidance and I would like to assure you of the fullest support of the Indian delegation in all your endeavours.

(Mr. Chandra, India)

I am taking the floor today to read out the following statement in my capacity as the G-21 Coordinator on NTB:

"The Group of 21 is extremely disappointed and fully shares the concern expressed by the international community at the decision recently taken by a nuclear-weapon State to suspend its moratorium and resume nuclear-weapon testing soon, as well as at the nuclear test recently conducted by another nuclear-weapon State. The States parties of the NPT of G-21 are deeply concerned that such developments run counter to the decisions adopted at the 1995 NPT review and extension Conference, in particular, the decision on 'Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament' and jeopardizes the credibility of the NTP regime. This is a serious setback to the ongoing negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT) and undermines its successful conclusion. The Group of 21 urges that a moratorium on nuclear testing should be observed by all nuclear-weapon States during the CTBT negotiations and until the entry into force of the CTBT.

"Conducting or intending to conduct nuclear-weapon tests over and above the substantial number of tests already conducted raises serious questions about the nuclear-weapon States' real intentions with regard to continued development of nuclear weapons. Recent reports about discussions among the nuclear-weapon States on a threshold for a test ban have also given rise to deep concern. The Group holds that consistent with the terms of the mandate of the Ad Hod Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban, the CTBT should be an instrument against both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation and should effectively contribute to nuclear disarmament. To admit low-yield nuclear testing or to permit testing below a certain threshold by using any technique would defeat such purposes. The Group of 21 reiterates that the CTBT should entail obligations for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States in all environments and for all time. No tests should be allowed for any reason or justification including the so-called safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons and perfecting the techniques to further develop nuclear weapons. The ban should be comprehensive. The nuclear-test-ban issue is a global issue and all its aspects should be multilaterally negotiated in the CD. In this context, the Group of 21 calls upon the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to take appropriate measures to ensure that negotiations are held for a clear understanding on the scope of the future CTBT.

"The Group of 21 has already expressed its concern in its earlier working papers on the possible use of national technical means (NTMs) for verification purposes. The Group stresses that the NTMs should not be used on a case-by-case and selective basis. The Group also reiterates that the organization should have the capacity and the responsibility of analysing all data. The judgement by the organization in this regard should be based on data received from the IMS. Moreover, it should be the exclusive responsibility of the organization to carry out on-site inspection in areas both within and beyond the jurisdiction or control of States parties. The Group is also not convinced of the logic of any

(Mr. Chandra, India)

'voluntary' funding for the international monitoring system (IMS) since the cost of the verification activities of the organization shall be borne by the States parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the organization of the CTBT.

"In view of the above, the Group of 21 reiterates its earlier call upon members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, for an early conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in 1995".

I request that the above statement of the G-21 may be issued as a working paper of the Conference and the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kinds words addressed to me. The secretariat will circulate the statement by the Group of 21 as a Conference document. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Goonetilleke.

Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, my delegation is taking the floor for the first time since you took over the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. May I, therefore, take this opportunity to warmly welcome you and congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency? My delegation is convinced that under your able stewardship we will be able to achieve success in the important matters that are being dealt with by the Conference.

The purpose of my statement today is to express the position of Sri Lanka on the resumption of nuclear testing. In doing so, I should mention that my delegation subscribes fully to the statement just made by the Ambassador of India on behalf of the Group of 21.

Sri Lanka notes with deep concern the continuation of nuclear testing by one nuclear-weapon State and the recent decision made by another to resume testing. These developments are all the more regrettable, taking place so soon after the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) review and extension Conference during which the nuclear-weapon States undertook, inter alia, to exercise "utmost restraint" in nuclear testing.

Sri Lanka, however, is pleased to note the undertakings given by these nuclear-weapon States to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) no later than the end of 1996.

While expressing its concern at these unfortunate events, Sri Lanka urges the members of the Conference on Disarmament to conduct their negotiations with renewed vigour to ensure the early conclusion of a CTBT by 1996. In this regard, Sri Lanka wishes to reiterate its strong conviction that the treaty should be comprehensive and without any provision for exceptions; universal; and internationally and effectively verifiable. The CTBT should ban all nuclear testing, in all environments, for all time.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka

I would be grateful if the text of this statement is issued as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distributed to the member States and non-member participants of the Conference on Disarmament.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and for his kind remarks addressed to the Chair. The secretariat will distribute the text of the statement of the Government of Sri Lanka. I now call on the representative of Australia, Mr. Cole.

Mr. COLE (Australia): I have asked for the floor today, briefly, to dra delegations' attention to a statement made by the Prime Minister of Australia on 23 June relating to French nuclear testing. This statement announced a series of further measures agreed to by the Australian Government on 22 June, further measures, decided against the background of French rejection of the efforts of a delegation from the South Pacific Forum, led by Australia's Foreign Minister Senator Evans, to persuade France not to proceed with the tests.

Our response has been measured. Our response has been strong, unequivocal and concrete, as has been the case for all nuclear testing regardless of the State perpetrating it.

Most importantly for this forum, this response contains a number of specific measures focused upon achieving a universal moratorium on nuclear testing and the earliest possible conclusion of an acceptably formulated comprehensive test-ban treaty by this negotiating forum. We look forward to the further energization of our negotiating effort to achieve this objective and to responsible leadership by the nuclear-weapon States in making this objective, to which all are unequivocally committed, a reality. My delegation will be seeking the distribution of the Prime Minister's statement as an official document of the Conference.

Mr. SANCHEZ APNAU (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): First of all, Mr. President, allow me to convey to you our satisfaction at seeing you presiding over the work of our Conference after your recent arrival in Geneva.

The Argentine Republic regrets that France, a country t which we are bound by major political, economic and cultural ties, has deemed it necessary to resume its nuclear tests. We hope that this will be the last time that nuclear tests are announced to the international community. This concern is based on my country's well-known policy regarding disarmament and non-proliferation, illustrated by the efforts we have made to secure the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the early conclusion of the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty now under negotiation in this Conference.

The Argentine Republic takes note of the fact that the announcement made by President Chirac on 13 June refers to a last series of tests which are limited specifically in time, and views positively the Presidential commitment made on behalf of France to sign the test-ban treaty without reservations in the autumn of 1996.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Argentina for his statement and the kind words addressed to me. I have no further speakers on the list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? I give the floor to the representative of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Yong-Shik Hwang.

Mr. HWANG (Republic of Korea): Mr. President, once again my delegation congratulates you on your assumption of the presidency of this august body. With regard to the statement made earlier by the representative of North Korea, I would like to make a few brief remarks.

First of all, we are disappointed by the remarks of the North Korean representative today. The major part of his remarks, relating to the Korean peninsula, is totally unfounded and groundless, based on unilateral political propaganda. Certain remarks have been repeatedly made in the past also, but to make it clear, I shall make only two points. One is: the North Korean representative said that the Armistice Agreement, concluded in 1953, should be replaced by other peace mechanisms, and the second point I want to raise is the assertion that South Korea has many nuclear weapons. I think nothing could be further from the truth. First of all, it is North Korea which has flagrantly violated the Armistice Agreement since 1953. My Government is of the view that what we should do now is to strengthen the Armistice Agreement and to find out every possible means conducive to creating confidence-building measures. In doing so, my Government recently suggested to give 150 tons of rice free of charge to North Korea. The second point I want to raise is that it was North Korea which was found under great suspicion to make nuclear weapons. In 1993, IAEA found a big discrepancy between what North Korea reported to IAEA and what the IAEA had expected. It is my delegation's understanding that this Conference is a multilateral forum, designed to make a contribution to the development of multilateral disarmament through productive and forward-looking statements. Based on this understanding, my delegation again urged North Korea not to repeat political propaganda in this Conference, but to show us a positive attitude towards the common effort in the direction of enhancing world peace and security.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Republic of Korea for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): I have already had occasion several times to explain the reasons behind our decisions relating to nuclear tests, and I would not wish to tire the Conference with a repetition. None the less I think it would be helpful and even necessary to recapitulate a number of points that I have already mentioned. In the past few weeks, I have in particular stressed the fact that it was not one but two decisions that France had adopted. I think everyone is now aware that the decision to conduct a last series of tests, restricted in number, limited in time, is inseparable from the commitment entered into by the President to sign in the autumn of 1996 the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that we are currently negotiating. The fact that some are pretending to overlook this commitment or minimize its scope does not detract from the fact that this commitment has

(Mr. Errera, France)

been entered into and that its scope is considerable, as a number of speakers this morning pointed out, or emphasized. From that standpoint, as I have already indicated, the French decision, far from jeopardizing the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty or making it more difficult, more complicated, on the contrary is contributing and will contribute to its successful conclusion. I have also stressed, but I must once again reiterate this, that the decisions we have adopted are fully consistent with international instruments, in particular and including the texts that we signed at the review and extension Conference for the non-proliferation Treaty, notably the declaration on principles and objectives. These texts, if I may once again repeat, are texts that we negotiated with seriousness of purpose, with a completely transparent approach as regards the constraints to which we were subject, and specifically, at no stage did we conceal the fact that the option of a resumption of testing was open. We respect those texts and we will continue to comply with them.

Finally, we are naturally attentive to the concerns that are expressed and we are doing our best to respond to them, to respond to them, as I have also indicated, through a concern for dialogue and a concern for transparency. None the less, it goes without saying that among the statements made on this subject, there are some that are of particular importance, some have a particular flavour. It goes without saying that lessons in virtue carry all the more weight if they are delivered by countries whose conduct in the field of non-proliferation is beyond reproach. Those same statements bring a smile to one's lips when they are selective or when they come from countries whose respect for international commitments in the field of non-proliferation continues to be a genuine source of concern for the international community.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of France for his statement. I now have no further speakers on the list.

The secretariat has circulated today a timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. This timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As is customary, the timetable is indicative and may be amended if necessary. If there are no objections I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable. As you are aware, in keeping with the decision taken by the Conference on 21 August 1990 (CD/1036), there is the possibility of holding a plenary in the morning of Tuesday, 4 July. The secretariat will inform the Conference in due time if this meeting is to take place. The same applies to the informal consultations scheduled for Wednesday, 5 July.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The Coordinator of the Group of 21 has asked me to announce that that Group will be meeting in this room immediately after the conclusion of this meeting.

(The President)

I would like to inform you that intensive consultations and fruitful negotiations have been held on the organization of work. The Chair is of the impression that we are very close to reaching agreement. I think that differences remain on only one out of eight items, and they are ancillary rather than substantive. I have convened the group coordinators for a meeting this afternoon after the plenary meeting we will be holding, and I would like to appeal personally to all delegations to give their group coordinators sufficient leeway and sufficient flexibility to allow us to reach an agreement in which all delegations have participated and to which all have made significant and very imaginative contributions.

We have no further business before us, and therefore I shall now suspend this meeting until 3.15 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 11.45 a.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The 710th plenary meeting is resumed.

In reopening the meeting I would like to extend a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference on Disarmament and on my own behalf to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, His Excellency Mr. Andrei Kozyrev. The personal interest which Mr. Kozyrev has displayed for years on the subject of arms control and disarmament, and his thorough knowledge of the matters on our agenda, are well known to us all. Three years ago, in 1992, Mr. Kozyrev addressed this body on the eve of the final phase of the negotiations on the Convention on chemical weapons. His presence among us today augurs well for the success of our work in the Conference on Disarmament as we approach the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I am sure that his statement will contribute to the attainment of that objective.

As my predecessor announced in the Presidential consultations held on 7 June, the next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held in the afternoon of Thursday, 6 July at 3.30 p.m., to allow the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to deliver his statement to this forum, as well as the speakers on the list.

I invite the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Mr. Andrei Kozyrev, to take the floor.

Mr. KOZYREV (Russian Federation) (translated from Russian): Mr. President, I welcome you as the representative of the friendly Government of Mexico to this responsible position of President of the Conference. I sincerely wish you success in guiding the work of this important forum. I also thank you for the warm words you addressed to me.

In past years I have indeed had the opportunity to familiarize myself with the diplomatic inner workings of the Conference of Disarmament and the United Nations, and I must say that only a layman would consider this work easy, and the task of leading such a forum something like a sail on the

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peaceful waters of Lake Geneva. In fact we know, like the Secretary-General of the Conference, my fellow-countryman Petrovsky, who also has vast and ever greater experience of multilateral diplomacy, that this is a difficult task which causes sea-sickness in all but very experienced sailors and captains. They do not lose their bearings, and, like you and the Secretary-General, steer the ship in the right direction. Of course the Conference has a considerable amount of confidence in the experience of those gathered here. I could say that it is a kind of council of wise men in the area of disarmament and international security. At the same time, I feel that today there is a need to open up new horizons in moving the international community to a genuinely secure world.

Without exaggeration, two closely related events have marked a historic breakthrough in the field of nuclear disarmament: the signing of the SALT-2 Treaty and the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The partnership between Russia and the United States, to which there is no alternative, and which is gathering strength in a practical, not always easy but nevertheless constant movement forward, has made it possible to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race, in other words, to achieve something which even 10 years ago, let alone at the time when the Conference on Disarmament was established, seemed unlikely. Moreover, in only seven or eight years' time, the level of strategic arsenals will stand at only a third of the level possessed by two nuclear States, the United States and Russia, as recently as 1990. I should like to emphasize that the President of Russia and the Government are firmly committed to the goal of ratifying the SALT-2 Treaty. As the President's representative in Parliament on this subject, I can confirm that we will do everything in order to resolve this issue. It goes without saying that we can ratify the Treaty only if there is strict observance of the ABM Treaty based on agreement with the United States concerning the delimitation between tactical and strategic systems. There is understanding of this issue, and work is under way on these problems in accordance with the declaration issued during the visit to Moscow by the President of the United States on 10 May this year.

The indefinite extension of the NPT has provided a firm basis for further efforts by States in the area of nuclear disarmament. There is a possibility of further reductions and ultimately the elimination of this type of weapon of mass destruction. Let me repeat what I said recently at the Conference in New York: indefinite extension of the NPT is not a mandate for the five nuclear Powers to continue holding weapons forever, but a stimulus for them to make further active efforts towards disarmament. However, a new threat of unprecedented scope has been emerging with increasing clarity in the recent period, standing in contrast to these efforts by dozens of States arising from their concern about international security. I am speaking about the increase in terrorism on an extensive scale and in extremely cruel forms. The tragic events in Buddenovsk, Oklahoma City and Tokyo have shown that the world must sharply step up its struggle against the demon of terrorism and also erect a reliable barrier to attempts by terrorists to gain access to weapons of mass destruction: nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and any other types of weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Kozyrev, Russian Federation)

Closely related to this is the initiative put forward by the President of Russia at the Halifax meeting for the "group of eight" to hold a summit conference in Moscow to discuss the entire range of issues relating to nuclear security. This is another vital issue of international security, a matter of current concern both to State leaders and to ordinary citizens. It is therefore natural that President B.N. Yeltsin's initiative was supported by all our partners in the "group of eight". We intend to embark on consultations regarding the format and the agenda of the meeting without wasting time. The Kremlin leadership has just sent a letter on this subject to the other leaders in the "group of eight".

All of these trends in security and disarmament, both those which are promising and those which are alarming, point to a new agenda for the Conference for Disarmament, the main elements of which, I believe, should be the following.

First, new tasks in the area of nuclear disarmament. The end of the "cold war", and the emergence of a world in which Russia, the United States and other international factors are no longer on opposite sides, have posed the key questions of the role of nuclear weapons on the eve of the twenty-first century in a new light. They need joint thinking both by governments and by legislative bodies in the democratic countries, which have limited budgetary resources, and indeed by taxpayers too. Russia is committed to the ultimate goal of the full and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We suggest to all our partners that we should move jointly towards this goal, stage by stage, taking into account the specific approaches of each of the nuclear Powers. A good framework for discussing and resolving all these issues could be provided through the conclusion of an agreement on nuclear security and strategic stability, the drafting of which has been proposed by the President of Russia.

The fact that this session marks a milestone should also be displayed through the inclusion of an item on nuclear disarmament on the agenda of the Conference. I would stress - an item on disarmament. We deem it important to appoint a special coordinator entrusted with the task of producing proposals on the contribution which our multilateral forum could make to solving this global issue.

There is another priority for our agenda - the rapid conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban-treaty. Russia is doing everything to ensure that such a treaty is drawn up as quickly as possible, especially since the progress of the negotiations is making it possible to reach consensus on the key elements and conclude the treaty next year. The current national moratoriums on nuclear tests must be strictly observed. During the Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty the nuclear Powers agreed that pending the entry into force of the CTB treaty they will display utmost restraint. Consequently we find it hard to agree with those who allege that the continuation or resumption of nuclear tests is not in contradiction with that provision. "Utmost restraint" in this matter should be the same for all.

(Mr. Kozyrev, Russian Federation

And another urgent issue - prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapons. The adoption of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee of the CD has created the necessary conditions for an immediate start to negotiations on a treaty on this subject. The recently adopted resolution 984 of the United Nations Security Council on security guarantees for non-nuclear States, and also the harmonized declarations by nuclear Powers on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the NPT, constitute a new and genuine contribution to the strengthening of international security. Russia holds dear the concerns of the non-nuclear States and proposes that we go further and draft a legally binding international instrument on this problem.

Secondly, substantial progress towards the elimination of chemical and biological weapons is vital. As a depositary of the 1972 Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons, Russia has an interest in the creation of effective machinery for ensuring compliance. In this connection, it is important for the Ad Hoc Group of States parties to the Convention to proceed without delay to negotiations on the substance of a draft protocol on verification of the Convention, which could be submitted to the fourth conference for the review of the operation of the Convention in 1996, or later to a special conference of States parties.

The Russian Government is actively preparing to ratify the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We support the efforts of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague to prepare for the implementation of the Convention. However, it is essential to take account of Russian interests, particularly in matters relating to the conversion of former chemical weapons production facilities.

Thirdly, the Conference must address in earnest the problem of conventional weapons. The tragic events is Bosnia, and before that in the Persian Gulf and other crisis areas, have underlined the close interrelationship between the process of disarmament and the settlement of local conflicts. It is extremely urgent, in particular, to develop regional and subregional model agreements for the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons. The Conference cannot stand on the sidelines when it comes to these burning issues. And as a minimum there is a need for strict observance of the regimes introduced by the United Nations Security Council prohibiting supplies of weapons to areas of conflict, and first and foremost to the warring parties in Bosnia. There must be no double standards here. The many victims of local conflicts constitute convincing evidence of the fact that the problem raised by the United Nations Secretary-General of "micro-disarmament", as it has been called, is in fact global in nature. Therefore we propose that the Conference should step up its efforts in this direction, and in particular continue the work carried out in the CD last year to reach agreement on definitions of the concepts of military holdings and procurement through national production. The Ad Hoc Committee of the CD on transparency in armaments should be re-established. Initially perhaps a special coordinator could be appointed to secure agreement on a new mandate for the Committee. This would be better than a continuation of the deadlock affecting the transparency issue.

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Fourthly, the effectiveness of the work of the Conference itself must be increased. The current membership to the Conference does not fully reflect the new realities. Following the end of the "cold war" it is worth reflecting also on issues related to "balance" in the membership of the CD, especially since all the members have what amounts to a veto. In this connection, perhaps as soon as the special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament in 1997 we could discuss ways to improve the entire disarmament process. Primarily, we believe, we could consider focusing efforts in this direction in the Conference on Disarmament, which is the single forum for multilateral disarmament and an important link in the emerging system of international security. For these purposes there is a need not just to expand the membership of the CD but also to make its mandate more comprehensive. We also need to think about ways of overcoming unnecessary fragmentation of the disarmament process and concentrating it under the CD. This will also make it possible to outline ways of improving the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Just under 100 years ago, in 1898, Russia was the first to put forward an initiative for limiting and reducing armaments on a global scale and to suggest the convening of an international conference on this issue. The concept of the harmful effects of the arms race on the economic well-being of States and the immorality of using scientific and technological achievements to create ever newer ways of destroying people took shape for the first time on the lips of my fellow-Russians. However, mankind had to go through two world wars and the decades of the cold war before these ideas started to become really integrated in world politics.

I should like to express the hope that this year of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the most destructive war mankind has ever seen will constitute a milestone at which the Conference on Disarmament will formulate a new agenda for the establishment of a truly secure world in the twenty-first century.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation for his important statement, as well as for the kind words addressed to the Chair.

Before I adjourn this meeting I wish to remind you that Working Group 2 of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban will be meeting immediately after this plenary here in this room and that the coordinators of the groups are invited to Presidential consultations.

The meeting rose at 4.30 p.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.710/Corr.1
3 August 1995

ENGLISH ONLY

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND TENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 29 June 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Antonio de Icaza (Mexico)

Corrigendum

Page 20, first full paragraph, lines 2 and 13

For SALT-2 read START-2

GE.95-63391

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.711
6 July 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 July 1995, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Antonio de Icaza (Mexico)

GE.95-62604 (E)

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 711th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

First of all, let us offer a warm welcome on behalf of the Conference to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who will be the first speaker today. We are very grateful to the Secretary-General, who, despite his extremely heavy schedule during his stay in Geneva, has found sufficient time to address this Conference. His presence today is proof of his personal interest in the problems of arms control and disarmament and the importance he attaches to our negotiating forum, especially at this crucial time when our efforts are focused on the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I am certain that I speak for all of us when I express my conviction that Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's presence today will give decisive impetus to our work.

I am also very pleased to extend a cordial welcome on behalf of us all to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, His Excellency, Mr. Erik Derycke, who will also make a statement in this plenary meeting. His visit today is further proof of his country's continued and sustained interest in the work of our Conference. In addition to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, the list of speakers for today includes the representatives of the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sri Lanka, India, Japan, Nigeria and Armenia. The Chair will make a statement at the end.

I invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to make his statement.

Mr. BOUTROS-GHALI (Secretary-General of the United Nations) (translated from French): I am delighted to have an opportunity to be among you today, and thus to be able to tell you how much importance I attach to the work of your Conference. Our present commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Charter offers us all an opportunity to reaffirm that from the very beginning the United Nations set itself the goal of formulating "principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments". For a long time East-West antagonism stood in the way. Moreover, the advent of the nuclear age played a large part in disrupting the original plan. Similarly, the accession to independence by large numbers of new States and the growing globalization of international relations made disarmament talks increasingly complex, increasingly difficult. And yet, despite all kinds of problems, the Conference on Disarmament managed to become, during that difficult period, a "single multilateral negotiating forum" within the United Nations system.

I have appreciated the skill with which you concluded the Convention on the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons in 1992. As depositary of the Treaty [illegible] offer strong encouragement for you today for you to promote [illegible] into force as soon as possible. I myself have sent personal letters to the heads of States that have not yet ratified the Convention, calling [illegible] to accelerate ratification of this Convention.

(Mr. Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations)

We are now embarking on a new era in international relations! The cold war is over! East-West antagonism has disappeared, together with the strategic bipolarity that was its hallmark! You now have a chance to devote yourselves fully to your task, far from the ideological disputes that stood in the way for so long. You can therefore tackle disarmament issues in a more focused and realistic manner. You can conceive the disarmament of the future! Of course we are well aware that not all the problems of the past have been fully resolved. Such problems still make great demands on your attention. But to a larger extent than before you can be receptive to new proposals and new perspectives. I know that that is truly the spirit of your Conference.

Your agenda begins with the major, not to say key, question of the nuclear test ban. We know that the question still provokes much debate and much political divergence. It also poses technical challenges and problems of verification. But a nuclear test ban remains one of the world Organization's major projects. Since 1957 it has been on the agenda of the General Assembly, which since then has constantly invited all States to subscribe to it. Indeed, last year I myself had occasion to express in my Annual Report my satisfaction that the participants at this Conference had embarked on serious negotiations for a universal, multilateral and verifiable treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing. The conclusion of such a treaty by 1996 would unquestionably be a step forward for the international community. To my mind it is a must. For failure to reach agreement rapidly on nuclear testing would directly undermine the efforts recently undertaken by the international community with regard to nuclear disarmament. I therefore wish to emphasize the extreme importance of the negotiations scheduled for this session of your Conference. And I know that you will spare no effort to achieve a favourable outcome without delay. Moreover, as Secretary-General of the United Nations I wish once again to recommend formally a halt to all nuclear tests without exception! Such measures must be universal! In this connection we must pursue our dialogue so as to honour the commitment towards moderation assumed in that area. I think that is necessary today if there is to be prompt ratification of the Treaty. I am sure everyone realizes that a multilateral agreement on a nuclear test ban would be a decisive step towards freeing the world from the threat of irreversible destruction.

In the same context, I have noted with great interest this Conference's action to promote the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such a prohibition would be immensely gratifying to the international community. For it would represent undeniable progress towards our twofold objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It is comforting to know that as we near the end of a century in which the use of fissile material for nuclear weapons became possible, we are now taking the necessary action to ban their use for purposes of destruction. The system of verification which the international community has undertaken to establish since the dawn of the nuclear age must extend to the transfer of materials that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. For such materials are bought and sold on the black market and used to stock arsenals whose compliance with storage norms, for example, is not

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subject to verification. While I am aware that the storage of nuclear weapons is not included in the agenda of this session, I wish nevertheless to mention it since the stakes involved are now too high to be overlooked.

I also appreciate the efforts which the Conference is making in pursuance of Security Council resolution 984 of 11 April 1995 to include in this session's agenda the development of measures or effective agreements aimed at protecting non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. And I am aware of the careful attention which you are giving to the possible elaboration of an international convention between nuclear-weapon States and States seeking protection against the use of such weapons. For there is clearly a need for security guarantees pending the achievement of global nuclear disarmament. This issue has been under consideration since the 1960s, that is to say since the negotiation of the non-proliferation Treaty. I hope that it can be resolved here in a manner that will give us encouragement for the future and that, like the other issues being debated at this session, it will benefit from the recent success of the non-proliferation Treaty. Indeed, this Treaty has paved the way to a new concept of international relations! Its indefinite extension marks an important milestone in our collective search for a world of shared peace and security. The States parties unanimously adopted a declaration of principles and objectives concerning nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In this way, the international legal barriers against nuclear proliferation have been strengthened. For this Treaty, which has succeeded in making non-proliferation a norm of international conduct, provides a political and legal framework for the commitment of all to nuclear disarmament. It calls for universal accession, and for the establishment of practical, effective and verifiable measures. As such, it should be a source of inspiration for the successful completion of the work that was started so long ago.

Another important issue to be considered during your session is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is natural that such an issue should be under consideration today, since activities in space and the number of countries capable of launching and conducting such activities are steadily increasing. In this connection, I am aware of the many problems posed by the multiple uses of outer space, especially its continued use for military purposes. I therefore consider that there is a need to promote confidence-building measures and guarantees with respect to the common use of outer space. Our aim should be the pursuit of security and transparency in space activities, to ensure that space is used solely for the benefit of mankind. This commitment must go hand in hand with examination during this session of the issue of transparency in armaments. For transparency, that is to say, openness combined with freedom of verification, is the key to all progress in the field of disarmament. In this regard, we must encourage a moderate, gradual approach to the problem. The search for concrete, universal and non-discriminatory procedures in military matters can open the way to building greater confidence among States in matters concerning armaments. This is one aspect that we must not overlook. For it contributes to the development of stable relations among States. Greater transparency in this field can certainly contribute to regional and world security by reducing the

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risks of misunderstanding and distrust among States. But this transparency in military matters should not be limited to a public accounting of defence arsenals. It must also extend to international trade in and transfers of weapons. For I am particularly concerned at the ease with which weapons of all types can be acquired, and by the growth in the illicit arms trade. In this regard, I remain convinced that the maintenance and periodic review of the Register of Conventional Arms would contribute to this necessary effort to achieve transparency. For the only common expression of a humanity that has found greater freedom through greater peace is mutual trust.

The agenda of this session has thus set itself objectives that are both ambitious and necessary, because it also sets out a global programme of disarmament. Within the framework of the Conference, this global programme has two main aspects. The first concerns nuclear disarmament beyond the START II agreements. As we are aware, its aim is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The other deals with the area of conventional weapons by placing special emphasis on conventional arms and the need for a regional approach. Bearing in mind this twin objective, we should more than ever today place our conception of disarmament in a new framework. For we can now conceive of disarmament in more holistic terms in order to make it a genuine instrument of collective security! Disarmament should be understood within the framework of security. It is inseparable from peace. As such, it is a cardinal element of the purposes of the world Organization.

I shall follow your deliberations all the more closely, therefore, because the imperatives of disarmament are a constant presence in the diplomacy which I endeavour to practise in the service of peace. For my part, I look at disarmament as an essential factor in my efforts to promote a safer world. One of the most important instruments! It fits in naturally with our commitment to preventive diplomacy, in peace-keeping operations, for post-conflict peace-building and in the possible imposition of sanctions. I believe that concrete effective measures are needed to build peace! Disarmament as we conceive of it today should be one of the major tools that I wish to use in pursuit of security. This is why I included the topic of disarmament in my Agenda for Peace, which I submitted to the Security Council in 1992. I wished to draw particular attention to the distortions that still hindered our progress. We must continue to encourage more countries to support the cause of nuclear disarmament, as upheld in the non-proliferation Treaty. At the same time, however, we must be attentive to the rise of new regional ambitions that may give new impetus to trafficking in weapons of all sorts. At a time when we are striving to promote nuclear disarmament, the proliferation of conventional weapons is becoming an increasingly serious problem. The broadest possible approach is therefore desirable. 'For both conventional and nuclear weapons, each in their own way, pose a threat to collective security. In this regard I am especially concerned at the increase in the illicit transfer of arms and weapons technology. For this development may well have a considerable impact on international security. We must therefore be vigilant and strengthen the verification measures in this area.

(Mr. Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations)

In this context I have already had occasion to point out the essential role of regional measures in the promotion of disarmament. Not only general disarmament, but also what I call "micro-disarmament", to use a fashionable phrase. Initiatives in Africa, central Asia, the Middle East, but also in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean illustrate the major contribution of regional organizations to the global security effort. This highlights the need for the coordination of efforts. And the vital need to understand disarmament as a global enterprise involving regional organizations, States and the international community as a whole. I make this point in order to underline the importance of the actions that will stem from your deliberations, and in order that our approach should not be limited to declarations. For disarmament, as an instrument of collective security, must accompany measures taken by the world Organization to promote peace and economic and social development. Your concerns are thus my concerns. And I also wish to affirm here my support for the process of enlargement of the Conference and to strongly encourage the accession of new members. In this way today's geopolitical realities will increasingly be taken into account.

You have paved the way to further international cooperation by engaging your efforts and competence in the service of disarmament. And your decisions here in Geneva, in this city which has given so much to the diplomacy of peace, will have an impact on international security in the future. Your Conference provides us with an exceptional forum for multilateral negotiation. It must now become a guide in the conduct of multilateral negotiations, thought out from a new perspective, and free from the constraints of the past, from the constraints of the cold war.

Hence it was my wish to reaffirm here the commitment of the United Nations in the field of disarmament! For only a common determination and unshakable conviction can enable us to build together a universal civilization, a civilization which we will not be ashamed to bequeath to the future generations to whom we committed ourselves, 50 years ago, in the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his major statement. I shall now suspend the plenary meeting so that the Secretary-General of the Conference and myself can accompany the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The meeting was suspended at 4 p.m. and resumed at 4.05 p.m.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): The meeting is resumed. I now have the honour to call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, His Excellency Mr. Eric Derycke.

Mr. DERYCKE (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. President, allow me first of all to congratulate you on taking up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to say how pleased I am to see the work of this body conducted by an eminent representative of Mexico. I wish you every success in discharging your duties and assure you of my delegation's full cooperation.

(Mr. Derycke, Belgium)

Allow me also to place on record Belgium's respect for the work of His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is here with us. The international community owes a great deal to his action to promote peace and international security. My greetings also go to his Personal Representative, Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, whose dedication and professionalism make a major contribution to the success of the Conference's work.

All of us here are aware of the historic importance of this annual session of the Conference. It coincides with a most eventful period for disarmament and international stability. Fifty years after the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations, we have just been celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The renewal of this Treaty has happily been concluded in New York with its indefinite extension. This demonstrates that the international community can shoulder its responsibilities when it faces a fundamental challenge.

The Conference has always made a decisive contribution to resolving disarmament problems. Its principal achievement is to have negotiated the Treaty banning chemical weapons. I wish to pay tribute to the Conference for that major success. Today, this Conference's responsibilities include the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. As you know, we are involved in these negotiations, and Belgium has repeatedly advocated a ban on all nuclear explosions everywhere. It is true that progress to date within the framework of the Committee has been appreciable. But if we are to comply with the deadlines on a Nuclear Test Ban Conference, we shall have to speed up our work. Study of the draft treaty laid down at the time of the NPT has made it possible to identify as of now the principle of an international monitoring system that will necessarily evolve over time. This system would, it is generally felt, provide a reasonable level of deterrence with an acceptable cost-benefit ratio. The structure of an organization responsible for implementing the future treaty is beginning to take shape. Everyone seems to agree on a three-level structure made up of a conference of States parties, an executive council and a technical secretariat. Data collection will be carried out by an international centre, which would carry out technical analysis; the political act of characterizing any doubtful event would remain the prerogative of States parties; the services of the International Atomic Energy Agency could be used for ad hoc operations. But we have still some way to go before a treaty can be signed, since the text we are working on still has more than 1,000 pairs of square brackets. That is not all: in fact, while progress has indeed been made in all the technical preparations, a great many political decisions still have to be taken, concerning the scope of the treaty, the respective powers of States and the executive council; entry into force or the funding of the entire operation. If we wish to meet the 1996 deadline, it is high time that we found a solution to all these problems.

Another subject worthy of our attention is a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Here we are forced to note that the progress made is disappointing. The attempts made in 1994 to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty in pursuance of resolution 48/75 L

(Mr. Derycke, Belgium)

failed. The question of stockpiles has been an obstacle here that your work has not managed to remove. In 1995, after lengthy negotiations, the decision was finally taken to establish an ad hoc committee known as the cut-off committee. With the mandate in place, there remained only to appoint a chairman, and this seemed to be a pure formality. Unfortunately this proved not to be the case. I call upon everyone to make concessions here, otherwise no progress can be made. The very image of the Conference in the eyes of public opinion depends upon it. The misuse of procedural subtleties distorts the Conference on Disarmament, which cannot be reduced to nuclear disarmament alone; there are too many wars in the world, too many victims, for us to neglect conventional weapons.

Finally, allow me to mention the recent Belgian chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, whose work was followed by the adoption of Security Council resolution 984. We hail that achievement: the Conference on Disarmament's contribution was more than creditable. I am all the more surprised that the CD did not immediately re-establish the NSA Committee after re-working its terms of reference on the basis of the recent New York decisions. I can only deplore this inertia and hope that it is not deliberate.

In closing, I should like to take up the crucial theme of the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. The very credibility of the negotiations is at stake. Belgium has never masked its commitment to such an expansion, because it considers the current membership an outdated hangover from the past. Unfortunately, here again the situation seems to be blocked, even though this is a crucial matter. At this stage there seems to be no other solution available than that of designating a special coordinator. He or she should have broad terms of reference, and should take into account the susceptibilities of all concerned, but should show that the CD is open to those with an interest in it and is not a closed club.

In closing, I appeal to all to help bring the Conference on Disarmament out of the difficulties it is experiencing. The rule of consensus is designed principally to strengthen decisions by showing beyond dispute that they have been accepted by all. To see in this rule only an opportunity to cast a veto is to distort its spirit. The CD's long history has shown its ability to carry out the tasks entrusted to it. The path ahead is not an easy one, of course, and we cannot expect complete success overnight. None the less I am certain of the absolute need for humanity to get rid of the means of destroying itself. This will be an inspiration for us in the future and will create in us and in our Governments the political will necessary to achieve the success that I wish for your Conference.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium for his major statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Ramaker.

Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands): Mr. President, it gives me great pleasure to first of all welcome you in our midst and, in the second place, to congratulate you on the assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. Like others I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the manner in which, practically immediately after your arrival in - or should I say return to? - Geneva, you took upon yourself the difficult task of trying to break the deadlock in which the work in the CD, other than the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, finds itself.

I take this opportunity to warmly welcome the Secretary-General of the United Nations in this hall and express my delegation's appreciation for the statement he just made. A cordial welcome also to His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, a country with which the Netherlands has, as you will be aware, particularly close relations. I would also like to take this opportunity to warmly welcome Ambassador Lafer of Brazil, Ambassador Tarmidzi of Indonesia and Ambassador Akram of Pakistan, who recently joined us in the CD. I am looking forward to closely cooperating with them.

I am taking the floor briefly today to inform the Conference that last Friday, 30 June 1995, the Netherlands deposited its instruments of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York. The conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention has generally been considered a milestone in the history of multilateral arms control and disarmament. It is the first treaty that comprehensively bans an entire existing category of weapons of mass destruction. It is characterized by one of the most strict and elaborate international verification regimes known to date.

Immediately after the ceremony in Paris, in January 1993, during which some 130 States signed the chemical weapons Convention, the ratification procedure was initiated in the Netherlands. The Netherlands Parliament, during the process of ratification, took an active interest in the Convention itself as well as in the many matters concerning the legislation necessary to implement the Convention. Parliament underlined the importance it attaches to the concept of challenge inspections, which it considers to be one of the essential instruments for ensuring compliance with the Convention and for confidence-building between States parties. Parliament also expressed its interest in ensuring the destruction of all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, as required under the Convention. For the success of the Convention it is, in the view of the Netherlands Parliament, essential that all States parties fulfil their obligations in this regard.

The Netherlands Government has always held the view that early entry into force of the Convention is of the utmost importance. The Netherlands, therefore, on the occasion of its own ratification of the Convention as the thirtieth State signatory to do so, wishes to echo the appeal just made by the Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and renews its call upon all States signatories which have not yet completed their

(Mr. Urrutia, Peru)

from carrying out these tests and to join the other nuclear Powers in a world moratorium while we endeavour to complete a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

Peru resolutely supports the intensive efforts that we have been making in this Conference to conclude a universal, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than 1996. Through the Geophysical Institute of Peru, we have been taking part for many years in developing the world network of seismic records that will serve as the main verification mechanism for the treaty, and from January this year onwards we began our active participation in the third technical test organized by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts (GSETT-3), in the shape of a beta seismic station, which is in the mountains near Lima. Similarly we have offered, and we again extend this offer, to have an alpha station in the future which would be located in the north of the country, and we have been holding consultations to that end with countries that are prepared to cooperate in its establishment. This station has been regarded as a potential station because of its location, logistics and low seismic noise level, which would be very important for monitoring seismic activity in the north-eastern part of South America, where major earthquakes have occurred in recent years.

We believe we have made major progress so far in the draft nuclear-test-ban treaty document. The progress made first and foremost as a result of the persistent and efficient work of Ambassador Marín Bosch and now the constant work being done by Ambassador Dembinski as Chairman of the Committee and Ambassadors Ramaker and Norberg in the working groups reflects the commitment entered into by States to pursue intensive negotiations aimed at the conclusion of such a treaty. However, we feel that it is important to clarify the question of the scope of application of the treaty. We consider that, in pursuance of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, States parties must assume a commitment not to carry out any sort of nuclear test and to refrain from taking part in any nuclear-weapon test explosion. Other important points of the treaty where solutions need to be sought are aspects relating to entry into force, the establishment of a single international monitoring system and the size or dimension and structure of the future organization.

I should also like to say how pleased my delegation is at the decision to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty to ban fissile material production. We think that this decision is of deep political significance, and we consider that the true effectiveness of the treaty will be related to the approach adopted to the question of future production of fissile material and existing stocks. We urge the committee to begin its work as soon as possible.

We view with great concern the fact that time is short. The first session has ended and the second one is almost over, and the Conference has not managed to establish or re-establish the other ad hoc committees - on transparency in armaments, negative security assurances, outer space, nor has it succeeded in appointing special coordinators to address the still pending issues on the agenda of this Conference. We offer you our full support, Sir,

(Mr. Urrutia, Peru)

in connection with the efforts you are making to find a rapid solution to these deadlocks, and hope that in the next and final session we will see work begin in the various committees.

My delegation attaches great importance to the work done by the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments. In pursuance of the General Assembly resolutions, my country has submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in recent years the requisite information for the Register on international transfers of conventional weapons, and we have also supplied information on military expenditure. In submitting those voluntary reports Peru wishes to confirm in practical terms its resolve to address matters relating to military expenditure with maximum transparency so as to move forward in due time towards what might be regional agreements on limiting expenditure on armaments in order to devote the greatest possible volume of resources to development. In recent years Peru has reduced its military expenditure and its purchases of weapons have largely been designed to combat the violence perpetrated by terrorist groups, which is now fortunately under control, and also to deal with drug trafficking.

In Latin America and in the Caribbean we have managed to establish effectively the first densely populated zone of the world which is free of nuclear weapons, and which also enjoys adequate security guarantees set forth in a legally binding document signed by the five nuclear Powers. Still pending in the region, none the less, is the question of conventional weapons and the establishment of machinery to monitor and reduce military expenditure where it exceeds the legitimate needs of national defence. For these reasons, Peru considers that in Latin America and the Caribbean non-proliferation must be extended without delay to conventional weapons. Because of their destabilizing effects, it is essential to curb the illicit arms trade and to strengthen international machinery relating to transparency in international arms transfer operations. That is why Peru has resolutely supported the broadening of the international United Nations Register to include national stockpiles and local production of armaments, as well as universal participation in it, which we consider will consolidate trust among States.

Finally, we should like to inform you that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of my country has arranged for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, together with the annexes to it, to be sent to the Congress of the Republic for consideration and ratification as quickly as possible. We are aware of the difficulties and complexities involved in the implementation of the Convention on chemical weapons. We therefore encourage all countries to take the necessary measures to prepare in advance for its entry into force, drawing as appropriate on the important advisory services provided by the technical secretariat in The Hague.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Peru for his statement and his words of support to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Dembinski.

(Mr. Dembinski, Poland)

which are conceptually controversial. Above all, it will be a rolling text in which issues critically important for the future CTBT, including scope, entry into force, withdrawal, verification and institutional issues, will have to be addressed and resolved. In the view of my delegation, the time to do so must be the next and final part of the current CD session. If the target date of autumn 1996 for the conclusion of the CTBT is to become a practical proposition - and I believe it is - it is imperative that we resume our endeavours at the end of this month and pursue them through September with renewed dedication, flexibility and a sense of purpose. This evidently will call for political judgement to be exercised and political decisions to be made in the capitals of each and every part to these negotiations. As was rightly noted in the G-21 statement last week, "the nuclear-test-ban issue is a global issue and all its aspects should be multilaterally negotiated in the CD". In these negotiations, therefore, no single issue could be resolved ahead of, or outside, the multilateral negotiating context.

We all are aware of the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" which have been agreed to at the NPT review and extension Conference. This important document set the target date for the completion of the CTBT "not later than 1996". It also urged the nuclear-weapon States, pending the entry into force of the CTBT, to "exercise utmost restraint". My delegation therefore fully understands the sentiments of delegations which have put on record their disappointment and regret over the polices of some nuclear-weapon States in regard to nuclear testing. We however also take note of the firm commitment of the President of the French Republic to sign the CTBT once it is completed by the above target date. In the view of my delegation, we should not allow the renewed nuclear testing to slow down the pace of the CTBT negotiations. On the contrary, our efforts need to accelerate in the months ahead if we are to discharge our responsibility in a timely fashion.

Gratified as we are by the determination of the CD members to see a comprehensive test-ban treaty in place by 1996, we are among those numerous members of the international community which cannot be reconciled to the failure of the Conference on Disarmament to address issues whose generic name is conventional disarmament. Genuine international security concerns are - in the view of my delegation - incompatible with the indifference to the fact that over the last five decades millions perished in regional conflicts that have been fought with conventional arms.

It will not be easily understood by important segments of the international community that a body legitimately proud of its status as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum should abdicate its responsibility in this regard over procedural divergences. We therefore trust that after the "cooling-off" period of the summer recess, the Conference on Disarmament will be able to take an agreed decision in regard to conventional arms. Such a decision would demonstrate that we are not totally insensitive to the grim realities of the day and that we take due heed of the urgent appeals in that regard launched by inter alia some of the world's moral authorities, including our distinguished guest speaker of today, His Excellency the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Poland for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, Ambassador Goonetilleke.

Mr. GOONETILLEKE (Sri Lanka): Mr. President, it is indeed a pleasure for me to welcome you to Geneva and to the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation is confident that with your well-recognized diplomatic skills and experience in multilateral negotiations, you will be able to discharge the responsibilities of the presidency successfully. My delegation's cooperation will always be available to you in full measure. As we welcome you, we must say how much we miss your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Miguel Marín Bosch, who has left an indelible impression on the CD. Let me also welcome to the Conference on Disarmament our new colleagues, the Ambassadors of Brazil, Indonesia and Pakistan. My delegation also appreciates the direction of the work of the Conference so ably and amiably given by the immediate past President of the Conference, Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya. My delegation is sad to notice the absence of Ambassador Shannon of Canada and Ambassador Boytha of Hungary, who have left our company recently. Very soon, Ambassador Satish Chandra of India will depart our company. They all have contributed substantially to the work of the Conference and my delegation notes with appreciation the contribution they have made to the CD.

We are encouraged by the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations with us today. My delegation is confident that his presence, personal commitment to disarmament and the encouraging words he spoke will no doubt help the Conference on Disarmament discharge the responsibilities entrusted to it with added vigour.

The majority of delegations who spoke in the CD during the past few weeks expressed their joy and satisfaction at the successful conclusion of the review and extension Conference of the NPT in New York on 12 May. Despite its inability to come up with a final declaration, the Conference recognized that there was a majority of parties in favour of the indefinite extension of the NPT, thus casting aside permanently the apprehensions entertained by some States party to the Treaty that some day, somehow, its longevity will be threatened and the world community will be forced to deal with the serious problem of nuclear anarchy. It is important to recall that not only were the States party to the Treaty able to extend the Treaty indefinitely, but also, they were able to reach that historic decision without resorting to a vote. I will be stating the obvious if I were to say that such a vote would not have been without repercussions.

The decision on the indefinite extension was not the only important act of the Conference. It also succeeded in deciding on a set of "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Another decision was taken on a set of steps for "Strengthening the review process for the Treaty". Finally, a call was made to all States of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the NPT as soon as possible. This was the harvest we reaped in New York collectively, and collectively we shall enjoy the fruits of our labour in the years to come.

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

One thing is clear. This is not the time for us to sit on our laurels and congratulate ourselves for the good work done. My delegation sees the NPT Conference as an important milestone we have passed in our long and arduous journey in pursuit of nuclear disarmament leading to eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. If we fail to tread this path carefully and tirelessly, we would run the risk of sliding down the precipice only to end up where we started, or face a worse situation. We would do well to avoid such an eventuality at all costs: we should build upon our achievements until we reach our final goal.

We should not forget the fact that the decision we reached in New York was not to replace nuclear anarchy with nuclear apartheid. Nuclear weapons cannot be the preserve or the birthright of a handful of countries who split the atom first and closed the door on others. By indefinitely extending the NPT, we neither authorize the nuclear-weapon States to be the sole possessors of nuclear weapons indefinitely, nor did we concede that they have a right to use such weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon States have kept their part of the bargain. In keeping with the solemn commitment given in New York, the nuclear-weapon States should pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and chart the course for total elimination of this category of weapons of mass destruction. The Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body responsible for disarmament matters. Therefore, it is the responsibility of this Conference to commence work in that direction. The CD should establish an Ad Hoc Committee with an appropriate mandate in 1996 to commence negotiations on this important agenda item.

We should not ignore the fact that although on paper there are five nuclear-weapon States, in reality there are several others who have crossed the threshold and become undeclared nuclear-weapon States. Worse still, there are many others for whom crossing the threshold is only a matter of political decision. Given the advanced technical capabilities many countries have today, and the resources at their disposal, it is a small miracle that these countries have so far not opted to acquire nuclear weapons. The 25-year post-NPT period saw the emergence of several countries who developed a nuclear-weapon capability. Should we fail to achieve progress in nuclear disarmament and reach a decision on the elimination of nuclear weapons soon, that will be an invitation for others to follow suit.

It is for these reasons that States party to the NPT, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should commit themselves fully to and implement the set of "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". If these principles and objectives are ignored or go unimplemented, it may drive nuclear-capable countries to invoke article X (1) of the Treaty on the ground that their supreme interests have been jeopardized. None of us would dare say that such a scenario belongs in the realm of fantasy. We should avoid the temptation of being selective in putting into practice these principles and objectives.

Although it is hardly two months since the conclusion of the NPT Conference, I must confess to the fact that the post-NPT period has been less

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

than comforting for most of us. Hardly 48 hours had passed following the conclusion of the NPT Conference, when the vibrations of yet another nuclear test brought the reality home; that we have not yet seen the end of the beast which confronted humanity half a century ago. Soon thereafter, another nuclear-weapon State decided to break its three-year-old moratorium, and announced that it would conduct a series of tests. Confronted with escalating international public opinion, these nuclear-weapon States have been at great pains explaining their positions. As my delegation had occasion to express the position of my Government last week in this forum on these developments, I would refrain, at this point, from dwelling on this matter any further.

Apart from the undertaking given in article VI of the NPT "to pursue negotiations in good faith" for nuclear disarmament etc., there is nothing to prevent the nuclear-weapon States from continuing nuclear tests. To that extent, they can argue that they are operating within the Treaty. These nuclear-weapon States maintain that they must continue testing to ensure the safety and reliability of their nuclear weapons, prior to becoming parties to, or entry into force of the CTBT. Understandably, these positions hardly convince those who support the moratorium on testing. While some nuclear-weapon States seem to be losing no time to ensure the safety and reliability of their stockpiles, the non-nuclear-weapon States are traumatized by these events as such testing threatens their safety and security.

We should not permit a situation in which the number of nuclear warheads in the possession of nuclear-weapon States is significantly reduced, and at the same time allow qualitative improvement to the remaining warheads, so as to greatly enhance their range and/or destructive power. This would be inevitable, if we permit testing of any type of nuclear weapons under the future test-ban treaty regime.

In this context, it is rather disturbing to hear the views expressed during our negotiations that provision should be made in the CTBT for tests to assure the safety and reliability of existing nuclear stockpiles. While we are busy discussing the scope of the treaty, we hear murmurs behind our backs that some scientists favour continued testing of small nuclear devices. This is certainly a disturbing turn of events. At this crucial juncture of negotiations, members of the CD should weigh the consequences of promoting such ideas or insisting on such tests. We should bear in mind that the CD is negotiating for a comprehensive test-ban treaty and not yet another PTBT or a threshold test-ban Treaty. There should be no doubt in our minds that our collective endeavour here in the CD is to finalize a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a treaty should ban all nuclear testing, in all environments and for all time. It should attract universal adherence and contain provisions to cover the vast strides being made in science and technology that could help conceal nuclear testing, both large and small. Nothing should undermine the comprehensive nature of the test-ban treaty.

While the scope of the CTBT is being discussed, we should not entertain proposals that would undermine the comprehensive nature of the treaty. It is for this reason that Sri Lanka disagrees with the arguments advanced in favour of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). Since mankind's violent exposure to

(Mr. Goonetilleke, Sri Lanka)

nuclear energy half a century ago and hundreds of tests later, no place has been accorded to PNEs. This situation led to the disbanning of the PNE unit in the IAEA secretariat. The physical process involved in the explosion of nuclear devices, whether peaceful or otherwise, is the same. Given the indistinguishability between peaceful and other nuclear tests and their adverse impact on the environment and many other reasons, Sri Lanka is not convinced that PNEs will have a role to play in the post-CTBT environment. We should, therefore, not make provisions for PNEs in the CTBT.

As you are aware, this is the final meeting of the second session of the CD for 1995. Although a major part of the time allocated to the CD for this year has already been spent, I wonder whether we can justifiably be proud of the manner in which we have utilized the time and resources allocated to us. Needless to say that we are in this predicament today due to the situation created by us at the beginning of the first session. In this regard, we are most grateful to you, Mr. President, for the commendable efforts taken by you to get the CD out of the situation by proposing a package intended to create several ad hoc committees and other working arrangements, in addition to the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, the only Committee we have been able to establish this year. We extend to you our best wishes and continued cooperation to get the CD on track once again.

It is important that we should not follow the same path next year and find ourselves in the same predicament once again. One way to avoid a repetition is to reach an understanding prior to the conclusion of our work this year on the agenda and the work programme for 1996. If we succeed, we would be better placed to undertake the responsibilities entrusted to us; that is, to engage earnestly in negotiations on crucial issues which we have to finalize here in the Conference on Disarmament. To do otherwise will be an exercise in futility. We should think over this matter carefully and encourage the next President of the CD to conduct consultations and reach agreement before the end of our final session for 1995.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement and his words of support for the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of India, Ambassador Chandra.

Mr. CHANDRA (India): I regard it as a unique privilege to be making my statement in the Conference on Disarmament in the same plenary meeting at which we have heard the very thought-provoking address of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. His words are a reminder to the Conference of the immense amount of work that lies ahead of us in making the world a safer place.

When I first came to the Conference in January 1993, I found it in the throes of post-partum blues after the successful conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention (CWC). The question then on everyone's mind at the time was: will there be life in the CD after the CWC? I had felt then, as expressed in my first plenary statement, that there was indeed life after CWC. The intensive negotiations in the CD on the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban

(Mr. Chandra, India)

treaty (CTBT) and the animated debate on a variety of issues have over the last two years amply borne this out. In that session of the CD, I had also strongly urged the establishment of an ad hoc committee under agenda item 2 on cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. At that time, India was alone in that attempt. I am glad to note that there is now gathering support for this idea and that the Group of 21 is taking the lead in this endeavour. The idea has found support most recently in the statement made in this form last week by the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, His Excellency Mr. Andrei V. Kozyrev. The two notions that I have mentioned here are indeed interconnected. There should be life in the CD at least as long as nuclear disarmament has not been fully achieved. The work of this august body shall remain unfulfilled until the world has been rid of this awesome menace.

There is today increasing recognition of the final goal of elimination of nuclear weapons which we need to take advantage of by translating it into reality. What is required is international recognition of the irrelevance of nuclear weapons and the attendant doctrine of deterrence. This recognition will make possible the complete elimination of nuclear weapons through a multilaterally negotiated treaty. This, and not the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), affords the only sure route to the achievement of genuine non-proliferation. We believe that the NPT is a discriminatory treaty which divides the world into nuclear "haves" and "have-nots" and provides legitimacy to the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States (NWS). It is for all those reasons that we do not subscribe to the NPT.

We understand that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons cannot be achieved overnight. India had presented a phased, systematic and practical programme for this purpose within a time-bound framework in its action plan at UNSSOD-III in 1988. This action plan provides for a stage-by-stage achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world which lays down obligations for all States without discrimination.

The first phase of the action plan as proposed by us envisaged inter alia the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (CTBT). We hope, therefore, that his elusive treaty can be successfully finalized at an early date. As I had stated in the plenary last week in my capacity as the G-21 coordinator on the nuclear test ban (NTB), and in my earlier statements, the CTBT should entail obligations for complete cessation of nuclear tests by all States, in all environments and for all time. We are in favour of a comprehensive nuclear test ban without any loopholes for low-yield tests. There should be no exceptions for carrying out nuclear tests under any circumstances. It is with this purpose that we have put forward our proposal on the article on scope in our working paper No. 244.

As for the entire CTBT, the verification system for the CTBT should be universal in its application, non-discriminatory and should guarantee equal access to all States. The verification regime should be based on the international monitoring system (IMS) as well as the consultation and clarification process and, in rare cases, on-site inspections to be carried out only by the organization. The international monitoring system should be based on the four generally accepted technologies, notably seismic,

(Mr. Chandra, India)

radionuclide, hydro-acoustic and infrasound, and should have the capacity to assess, analyse and distribute data. The judgement in any case of non-compliance should be the responsibility of the organization. I would like to take this opportunity of expressing our deep appreciation of the efforts put in by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on NTB, Ambassador Dembinski, as well as the chairmen of the two working groups, Ambassador Norberg and Ambassador Ramaker, and all the Friends of the Chair and convenors.

As a co-sponsor of United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L, we welcome the setting up of an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate the convention to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We hope that negotiations will begin as soon as possible on this convention. In keeping with the parameters of United Nations General Assembly resolution 48/75 L and the agreed mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee, the convention should focus entirely on future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. We believe that the production of fissile material for civilian purposes will remain permissible and that this convention will not be applicable with retrospective effect.

On the issue of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons of negative security assurances (NSAs), India has consistently stated that the only credible guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons lies in the total elimination of such weapons. Pending the elimination of nuclear weapons, it is for the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) to provide all security assurances to NNWS in a multilaterally negotiated and legally binding form which is without any qualification or discrimination. United Nations Security Council resolution 984 does not adequately meet the above criteria as I had commented even at the draft stage in the CD plenary on 6 April earlier this year. We, therefore, hope that an ad hoc committee can be established at the earliest to address this extremely important issue. India has also for some time been proposing a convention for the prohibition of the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons and has regularly been tabling a resolution in this regard in the United Nations General Assembly which has been adopted with considerable support. We believe that the time has come to build consensus on this idea with a view to the early conclusion of such a convention.

Transparency in armaments in all its aspects can be an important building block in our efforts to achieve international peace and security. Of particular importance would be transparency relating to weapons of mass destruction and to the transfer as well as use of high technology for weapons purposes. Such transparency would assist in breaking the stranglehold of the discriminatory ad hoc control regimes. However, transparency should be seen for what it is - a method for building confidence - and should not become a substitute for genuine disarmament efforts.

The question of prevention of an arms race in outer space requires urgent and detailed consideration. The frontiers of space promise immense benefits for development in diverse fields for the whole of mankind, and it is

(Mr. Chandra, India)

essential to strive towards an international order which ensures that space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes. India hopes that an ad hoc committee will be set up to address the outstanding issues in this regard.

All of us are also involved in disarmament efforts outside this forum. India, as co-sponsor of United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/75 D on a moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land-mines, is ready to participate meaningfully in the review Conference of the 1980 inhumane weapons Convention to be held in September 1995, for which we have prepared through participation in the meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts. India had also actively participated in the Experts Group meeting or VEREX and the Special Conference on the biological weapons Convention (BWC). We believe that the biological weapons Convention should be appropriately strengthened.

Finally, I have had the privilege of interacting with all my colleagues past and present for the almost three years of my stint here not only in the CD but also in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. As I come to the end of my stay in Geneva, I would like to salute them for their professionalism, dedication and commitment to the cause of disarmament and their personal friendship and warmth. I treasure these associations and look forward to renewing them wherever possible in the future. I would also like to avail of this opportunity to express my gratitude to the Secretary-General of the Conference, His Excellency Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, the Deputy Secretary-General Mr. Bensmail and their efficient secretariat, as well as to the interpreters who work so untiringly for long hours. I would, finally, also like to thank, in particular, Ambassadors Dembinski and Goonetilleke for the kind words they addressed to me. I fully reciprocate their warm sentiments.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of India for his statement. Today Ambassador Chandra has made his last statement to the plenary of the Conference. I am certain that all the members of the Conference would like me to extend to him our gratitude for the devotion and the talent with which he has served his country in this forum. Ambassador Chandra distinguished himself by his term of office as President of the Conference on Disarmament in the second part of the 1994 session. With his imminent departure from Geneva, the Conference loses one of its most devoted representatives. We shall miss his negotiating skills. On behalf of the Conference, I wish Ambassador Chandra all the best in his future activities.

I now call on the representative of Japan, Ambassador Kurokochi.

Mrs. KUROKOCHI (Japan): At the outset, I wish to express my heartfelt respect to His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations, who is here with us today at this Conference. The S.G. has been making tremendous efforts to ensure international peace and security, with his strong personal awareness of the importance of the issues of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons. Japan, which spares no

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

effort to cooperate with the Secretary-General, earnestly hopes that substantial progress will be made in the fields of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation that are assuming more complicated aspects in the post-cold-war era.

The most important task of the Conference on Disarmament today is to expedite negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In this connection, let me stress once again that Japan regards as extremely regrettable the nuclear test conducted by China and the French decision to resume nuclear testing. We urge all nuclear-weapon States to respect the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" adopted at the NPT review and extension Conference, and to refrain from conducting any nuclear test, so as not to betray the confidence placed in th by non-nuclear States.

During this second session of the Conference, strenuous efforts have be made among delegations to grapple with many important issues in CTBT negotiations. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that many of the major issues have remained unsolved. My delegation regrets to say that the progress of t negotiations in this session is not quite satisfactory. The completion of t negotiations on a CTBT in 1996 is one of the most important undertakings of the international community specified in the "Principles and objectives". Nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States bear the responsibility to achieve this goal. In fact, there is not much time left fo us to conclude the negotiations and draw up the final text of the treaty, if States are to sign the treaty in 1996, hopefully, in autumn of that year at the latest.

After the cold war came to an end, significant steps were taken in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation such as the signing of START II and the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely. It is extremely regrettable if we are unable to produce sufficient results on a CTBT in this year, which marks the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War I feel it might help expedite the pace of negotiations if the negotiating States come to share the same understanding on a certain interim timetable fo reaching agreement on a number of major issues so as to conclude negotiations in good time.

It is essential in the next session of the CD that each State makes its utmost efforts to overcome the difference of positions on fundamental issues such as verification, organization and scope. My delegation intends to make its stands more specific, in the hope of making contributions to facilitate negotiations. Today being the last plenary meeting of the second session, I wish to touch upon some focal points briefly.

First, the issue of verification is an essential element of a CTBT. The reliability of a CTBT largely depends on the credibility of its verification system. Establishing a technically reliable and efficient verification mechanism is not an easy task. We should accelerate the treaty negotiations in order to meet the target date in view of the many points still remaining undefined. Considerable efforts have already been made by delegations on thi

(Mrs. Kurokochi, Japan)

issue. But I would like to re-emphasize the importance of the participating governments and decision makers in the negotiations to take leadership and indicate a definite direction, so that detailed work may be accelerated on the clear understanding of the common ground.

Concerning an international monitoring system, a number of issues should be further examined to establish it and make it operational. In particular, it is necessary to decide immediately the required capability as well as its funding.

As to on-site inspection, a decision has to be made whether OSI should be conducted in one phase or two phases. Such issues as the decision-making system for OSI implementation and its funding also need to be resolved.

Secondly, the CTBT organization should be established under the principle that it is small in size, efficient and cost-effective as much as possible, keeping the financial burden of each State party to a minimum and avoiding too much bureaucratization. Bearing in mind that it is a practical and appropriate option to pursue an arrangement by which we can avoid duplication with the activities of existing international organizations and make the best use of the expertise already possessed by those institutions, particularly IAEA, Japan is now considering Vienna favourably as a possible seat for the organization.

Moreover, the scope of this treaty is a central issue in the negotiation. For a conclusion of negotiations in 1996, utmost efforts to reach an agreement should be made during the third session of the CD. Japan, too, is determined to make its best possible contribution to this end.

A CTBT should embody a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban, not a threshold test ban. Any nuclear weapon test explosion or other nuclear explosion should be banned. It is not acceptable to allow any nuclear explosion, even if it is limited to peaceful purposes only, as is alleged by one State. In this connection, it is worthy to note that the United Kingdom and France showed their flexibility in the last session of the Conference in relation to so-called exceptional nuclear tests.

I should like to stress that the time has already come for each State to show a strong political will to solve all remaining major issues, so that we may fulfil the task entrusted to the CD by the international community, namely the conclusion of a CTBT in 1996. Japan earnestly hopes that the day will come soon when a CTBT is agreed universally and when we live in a world where mankind shall never experience another nuclear explosion. To this end, Japan will continue its endeavours together with all States concerned.

Mr. FASEHUN (Nigeria): Mr. President, we welcome you warmly and all our distinguished colleagues who joined the CD during the second session of 1995. We are also pleased at the presence of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and for his encouraging words on disarmament. On behalf of the Nigerian delegation, I bid farewell to Ambassador Satish Chandra of India, an

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amiable, effective and pleasant diplomat whose smile and wisdom will be misse in the course of the CD. A global nomad diplomat and I hope our paths will cross again. I wish Ambassador Chandra well in his new assignment.

Mr President, I join other delegations that have congratulated you on your assumption of the presidency. Since you took on the burdens of this Conference, you have demonstrated great stamina and creativity to ensure that the wide difference existing amongst delegations on the agenda is narrowed. It would have been our wish that your great and much admired efforts are handsomely rewarded. That this is not so is regrettable. We salute your predecessors also, especially Ambassador Don Nanjira of Kenya, from whom you took the baton.

Approximately seven weeks ago, States parties to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty decided, without a vote, to extend into perpetuity the Treaty. The decision was significant in that fear about the future of the Treaty was put to rest. Those of us who advocated rolling periods of extension of the Treaty shared the same vision with the majority of States parties that a world without nuclear weapons is achievable and indeed desirable. But we were of the view that nuclear-weapon States should be held accountable through a 25-year rolling extension decision. That view remains valid, especially in light of unsalutory developments since that historic decision. Amongst other things, nuclear-weapons testing is continuing, there are plans to revoke the moratorium for testing and proposals are being advanced that would convert the comprehensive test-ban Treaty into a threshold test-ban treaty. These developments are discouraging and tamper the course of non-proliferation. Indeed, they call to question the morally binding agreement stated in the "Objectives and principles" decision in the NPT. Nigeria calls on the States concerned to cease nuclear testing and requests States that have suspended testing to continue to adhere to the moratorium until the CTBT enters into force.

Against these recent unpleasant developments is the laudable decision of the summit of the Organization of African Unity which endorsed the Treaty for an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. This singular achievement in the African continent is a significant boost to non-proliferation and vindicates the position of African countries which for over three decades called for the denuclearization of their continent. A goal that appeared distant and seemingly unachievable is now at hand. African countries should be congratulated on this achievement. Nigeria calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to sign the Protocol to the Treaty so as to give the Treaty maximum effect.

An African nuclear-weapon-free zone is a significant step in non-proliferation but other steps are urgently needed. As a follow-up to the NPT review and extension Conference, this Conference should without further delay commence discussion on the mandate for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. Such a committee should be established in the beginning of 1996. Such a decision will enhance the seriousness of purpose of the CD and be a

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befitting 50th birthday present to the United Nations. I would like to end by quoting a very famous American politician. He said: "I see things that are and say, Why?, and see things that are not and say, Why not?" Why not an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament?

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now call on the representative of Armenia, Ambassador Melik-Chahnazarian.

Mr. MELIK-CHAHNAZARIAN (Armenia) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, I would like first of all to congratulate you on your election to the presidency of this Conference and wish you every success in guiding the work of this important forum. I have begun my statement in Spanish especially to express my respect for your beautiful country, Mexico, and for you personally.

This is the first time that the Ambassador of Armenia has had an opportunity to address the Conference on Disarmament. It is for me a signal honour to take the floor in the same plenary which was addressed by Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the United Nations, whom I wish to greet cordially on behalf of my country. I would also like to convey greetings to Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, with whom I had the pleasure and honour of studying and working in Moscow in times past.

The independent and sovereign Republic of Armenia, on acquiring observer status in the Conference on Disarmament, intends to participate actively in the negotiations which are being held here. Later on, when I learn the disarmament terminology in Spanish, I will be able to make my statements completely in the immortal language of Cervantes, but for the moment please allow me to continue in Russian with which I am more conversant.

(continued in Russian)

The Conference on Disarmament has repeatedly reasserted its exceptionally important role in the international disarmament process. Such important international agreements as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons and the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons were negotiated within these walls. Currently the attention of world public opinion is riveted on the negotiations under way here on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. We are profoundly convinced that the conclusion of a treaty on this subject will eliminate the dangers to international peace connected with the possible modernization of existing nuclear arsenals, and contribute to the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The recently adopted historic decision on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will doubtless further the successful conduct of these negotiations.

From the very outset Armenia adopted a position of principle regarding the need for the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty on the

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Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, believing that only such a decision is capable of guaranteeing that the Treaty will achieve its purpose. For us this was a separate goal and we did not link it with any other. We are convinced that this Treaty is an effective means of maintaining international security and stability, is in keeping with the interests of the entire international community and lays a sound basis for further efforts by States in the field of nuclear disarmament. The logical next step along this path should be further reductions in these appalling weapons of mass destruction, and subsequently their full elimination. At the same time I should like to stress that my country, which has consistently advocated the indefinite extension of the NPT, has counted and continues to count on the progress made in New York by the five nuclear Powers being perceived by them as a signal for active efforts towards disarmament. Hence the beginning of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in our forum would in our view be a turning-point in mankind's progress towards the desired goal, the full and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This would be the best confirmation of the fact that the voice of Armenia and that of other countries, dreaming of a world without nuclear weapons, has been heard and that real steps have been taken along this most important path. Of particular importance for us is the early conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests, which could be signed next year and would remove from the agenda forever the question of possible attempts to breach the existing national moratoriums on nuclear testing.

I would like to say a few brief words regarding our perception of the nuclear-test-ban treaty being drawn up by the Conference on Disarmament. To our mind the treaty should be comprehensive in nature. Its parties should be all the nuclear Powers as well as all the threshold States possessing the relevant nuclear potential. The treaty should provide for the creation of an effective verification system capable of monitoring all environments in which nuclear testing could possibly be conducted, that is, in the atmosphere, underground, underwater and in outer space. At the same time, the system should not place an unnecessary burden on the parties to the treaty. For such countries as Armenia, considerations connected with financial outlays on the future monitoring system will be crucially important. We share the view prevailing in the negotiations that the international monitoring system should include four basic monitoring methods - seismic, radionuclide, hydro-acoustic and infrasound - as well as on-site inspections. It is important that the organizational structure of the international monitoring system should not be discriminatory in nature and should offer large and small States equal opportunities. In this connection we support the creation of an international organization under the CTBT, and within it an international data centre; to our mind this would place all parties to the treaty on an equal footing.

Another important element in the package of nuclear issues before the Conference on Disarmament should be the development of a convention on prevention of the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and other explosive devices.

Armenia attaches great importance to the problem of security assurances to non-nuclear States. We welcome the resolution recently adopted by the

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United Nations Security Council on this issue, as well as the harmonized statements by the nuclear Powers regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the NPT. However, we believe that we should not sit on our laurels and that we should formalize these guarantees in a legally binding international convention. In this context we are in favour of the early re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative assurances in the Conference on Disarmament. We also believe that very useful work could be done within the context of two other ad hoc committees which it has not yet been possible to agree to set up. I have in mind the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments and the Ad Hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. As for the Ad Hoc Committee on outer space, it is time to give up the confrontational approaches of the "cold war" era and to move towards a search for truly achievable practical agreements, with a view to the creation of a regime which would forever guarantee the exclusively peaceful use of outer space.

The disarmament problem area constitutes a process which is huge in terms of dimensions and significance. We believe that considerable resources exist for completing this process. In this connection we support the proposals submitted at this session regarding the need for all disarmament efforts to be concentrated to the maximum possible extent within our Conference on Disarmament, which is truly unique and undoubtedly the most competent forum in this field. Bearing in mind the significance of the issues discussed here for the fate of mankind, my country believes the time has come to expand the membership of the Conference on Disarmament, pursuing the goal of making it more balanced and representative.

Geneva has distinguished itself as a venue for international disarmament negotiations, and not just those directly connected with the Conference on Disarmament. We welcome in particular the recently reached agreement on the start of work in Geneva by the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. We believe that these negotiations occupy an important place on the disarmament agenda, since they deal with an extremely lethal weapon of mass destruction in the possession of many countries. It is important that intensive efforts should be made within the framework of the Ad Hoc Group to carry out the task entrusted to it by the Special Conference of the States Parties to the biological weapons Convention, whose second session opens next week, on 10 July.

(continued in Spanish)

Allow me in conclusion to express my conviction that this Conference, as the multilateral forum on disarmament problems, will succeed in accomplishing successfully the tasks which have been entrusted to it. The delegation of Armenia, for its part, is firmly resolved to make its own modest contribution to the common effort, as the other participating countries do.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Armenia for his major statement, his words of support for the Chair and his amazing mastery of the language of Cervantes. The representative of Canada, Mr. Bishop, now has the floor.

Mr. BISHOP (Canada): Mr. President, since this is the first time my delegation has taken the floor of the plenary during your presidency, let me take the opportunity to express how pleased we have been to see you, our NAFTA partner, presiding over the meetings of the Conference. This has been a particular challenge for you, having just arrived in Geneva. My delegation would also like to thank you for your efforts over the period of your presidency to attempt to move the Conference forward on the full spectrum of the work of the CD. A number of weeks ago, you took the initiative to convene open-ended Presidential consultations in that context. You resumed that worthwhile initiative yesterday.

With respect to fissile material cut-off, it is worth recalling the achievements of this Conference. Last September, the Conference agreed in principle to establish an ad hoc committee on a ban on fissile material production, subject to agreement being reached on the appropriate mandate for a negotiation on that subject. After 14 months of consultations, all delegations here adopted the report of the Special Coordinator and established the Committee under the presidency of your predecessor, Ambassador Kurokochi of Japan. The report contained the mandate and attendant understandings. These were agreed by consensus, by all delegations. The adoption of the report and creation of the committee were not subject to any pre-conditions, or, in the language of the CD, to any linkage with any other work of the CD. The subsequent insistence by some delegations on successful resolution of issues relating to other work of the CD, when known differences of opinion exist on elements of that work, casts doubt on the commitment to the negotiation already agreed upon.

It is most unfortunate that we see a further delay in the commencement of the work on fissile material cut-off. We have a committee, a mandate and a chair candidate: it is incomprehensible to my delegation why we cannot carry through on commitments we have all made unconditionally and hold the first meeting of the committee. We are hopeful that the inter-sessional period will allow delegations time to reflect and so organize themselves that negotiations can begin in the next part, consistent with the commitments made in March.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and his words addressed to the Chair and I share some of his concerns. I now call on the representative of Romania, Ambassador Neagu.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): Mr. President, I asked for the floor to make a short statement. Before that, however, may I use this opportunity to welcome you in our midst and congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament? I assure you of the full support and cooperation of the Romanian delegation.

Mr. Neagu, Romania

I followed with great attention the important address of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, His Excellency Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The analysis and the suggestions put forward by the United Nations Secretary-General constitute a source of inspiration and concrete support in our endeavours to find solutions to topical questions we have before us in our quest for promoting disarmament.

I had the pleasure to remark that at our meeting of 8 June, the Romanian Government has been examining the possibility to declare a moratorium on exports of anti-personnel land-mines with a view to fully contributing to the current international efforts aimed at ridding the world of the scourge of these horrible weapons. I can now inform you that a moratorium has already been approved and entered into force on 1 July 1995. The Romanian unilateral moratorium applies to all categories of land-mines and it will last for an initial period of one year. This decision crowns the Romanian stance on land-mines and, in particular, our co-sponsorship in last year's General Assembly resolution on the establishment of moratoria in this field. Its significance redoubles since it came into force just days before the international conference on mine clearance started its proceedings. May I kindly ask, Mr. President, that this statement be circulated as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament?

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Romania for his important statement. I have no further speakers on my list, and if no one wishes to take the floor I shall make a brief statement.

Mexico's term in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament is drawing to a close. Allow me therefore to make a few remarks about the organization of our work, stemming from what has been for me a unique experience in leading this equally unique negotiating forum on a subject which is literally of vital importance. Some of these remarks are self-evident truths, and I apologize in advance for repeating them. This applies to the statement that the annual organization of work of the Conference has to be decided at the beginning of the year. After that, the passing of time undermines the sense of urgency and of the need to harmonize national agendas in pragmatic solutions. It is also pointless to recall that decisions on arms taken outside the Conference have an influence on the willingness of delegations to reach consensus. When such decisions are of particular importance, a period of reflection and internal digestion is called for. Finally, it is an understatement to say that it is not an easy matter to negotiate on disarmament against a background of explosions, or the announcement of explosions, of nuclear tests.

The foregoing may serve as a partial explanation, and not an excuse, for why we did not reach the necessary consensus to resolve the pending issues in the organization of work, despite the goodwill of all delegations, the skill and even the occasional flexibility of the group coordinators, and the efforts made by the Chair with the most efficient help of the secretariat. In order

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to discuss the matter. In the past four weeks we have held two meetings open to all delegations and four formal consultations with the group coordinators. In turn, the groups devoted practically all the time in their weekly meetings to this set of problems. As President I had 10 meetings where this subject was taken up, informally but very thoroughly, by a great many representatives, and I wish to express my gratitude to the heads of delegation that were kind enough to organize them. In all there were more than 20 meetings at which 15 different proposals were examined. But we began the exercise of organizing our work almost two thirds of the way through the annual session, immediately after the non-proliferation Treaty review and extension Conference, and while in plenary the main topic was actual or announced nuclear tests. Although the time was not the most propitious, there was no lack of will. If we did not reach consensus it was because of the difficulty of overcoming a chain of linkages which forced us into an overall approach that proved to be excessively ambitious. Here I would like to offer a rather less obvious statement: a linkage between related topics may be a useful instrument, but if it is maintained for too long, then it inevitably leads to a paralysing spiral of linkages in which new elements are introduced whenever an understanding is in sight. Although we did not achieve the result we all wished for, the effort was useful to air different opinions, evaluations, priorities and to specify areas of disagreement.

I shall now venture to read out the last of the informal proposals which were examined. The "non-paper" of 4 July, entitled "Draft Presidential statement", reads as follows:

"The Conference recalls its decisions contained in the 'Presidential statement on the agenda and organization of work for the 1995 session of the Conference on Disarmament' (CD/1294) and its decision to establish an ad hoc committee on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and decides:

"1. To initiate, under item 2 of the agenda, entitled 'Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament', the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Ban on the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, under the chairmanship of Ambassador ...

"2. To establish the Ad Hoc Committee on 'Prevention of an arms race in outer space' with the 1994 mandate (CD/1125), under the chairmanship of Ambassador ...

"3. To establish the Committee on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons' with the 1994 mandate (CD/1121), under the chairmanship of Ambassador ...

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"4. To establish an ad hoc committee under item 8 of the agenda to consider practical means of enhancing transparency in armaments, under the chairmanship of Ambassador ... The Ad Hoc Committee will take into account past and future proposals on the subject.

"5. To appoint Ambassador ... as special coordinator to resume consultations on the review of the agenda, and, in that framework, inter alia, to seek the views of member States on the issue of conventional arms and on the most appropriate institutional arrangement for its more thorough consideration in the Conference on Disarmament.

"6. To appoint Ambassador ... as special coordinator to make every effort to reach an urgent solution to the question of the expansion of the membership of the Conference.

"7. To appoint Ambassador ... as special coordinator to initiate consultations, in the framework of agenda item 2, on the early establishment of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.

"8. To request the special coordinators to report to the Conference on the progress achieved on the issues under their responsibility before the end of its 1995 session.

"The Conference reaffirms the importance it attaches to the conclusion of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and reiterates the priority it has assigned to this work."

I should like to place on record that as no agreement was reached on some of the paragraphs, none was adopted, and neither was the proposal as a whole. The main differences arose on paragraphs 4, 5 and 7, and concerned the priority and institutional arrangements that should be assigned to nuclear disarmament and conventional weapons. Unfortunately these differences prevent us from beginning work immediately not only on nuclear disarmament and conventional weapons but also on other topics considered to be of importance, such as fissile material, the arms race in outer space, negative assurances, the agenda and the expansion of the membership of the Conference. I consider that during the inter-sessional period beginning tomorrow, and of course in the third part of this year's session, delegations should give serious thought to the relevance of the system of linkages that is preventing us from taking up subjects that all delegations regard as important, and the need to pursue consultations to enable us to reach agreement in 1996 on the organization of work in the first week of the first part of our session. Meanwhile, let us continue our intensive priority negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. As far as I am concerned, I wish to assure all of you, in particular the group coordinators and the Conference secretariat, of my deep gratitude for your support, guidance, cooperation and unfailing courtesy.

I should now like to refer to the informal paper distributed by the secretariat that sets forth the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodes during the first week of the third part of the annual session, in other words, from 31 July to 4 August 1995. This

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timetable has been prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. As usual it is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. If I see no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT (translated from Spanish): I have no more matters to deal with, and accordingly I intend to adjourn the plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 3 August 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.712
3 August 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 3 August 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Shirchinjavyn Yumjav (Mongolia)

GE.95-63394 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 712th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

It is a great honour for me and for my country to take up the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament at the start of the third part of the 1995 CD session.

At the outset, allow me, on behalf of all of us, to extend a very warm welcome to the newly appointed Ambassador of India, Her Excellency Ms. Arundhati Ghose, who is with us for the first time today. Ambassador Ghose brings to our Conference a wealth of experience in bilateral as well as multilateral diplomacy, having served her country in Vienna, New York, Paris, Brussels and Cairo, among others. I am sure the Conference will benefit greatly from the diplomatic skills traditionally associated with her country's representatives. Whilst assuring Ambassador Ghose of our cooperation and support, I should also like to wish her every success in her new post. I also take this opportunity of welcoming the new representative of South Africa, His Excellency Ambassador Selebi, who is also among us for the first time today.

I would like to thank His Excellency Mr. Vladimir Petrovsky, Secretary-General of the Conference and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Mr. Abdelkader Bensmail, Deputy Secretary-General of the Conference, for their valuable support and services to the Conference.

Allow me also to express my deep appreciation and respect to my predecessor Ambassador Antonio de Icaza of Mexico for his commendable efforts to reach a compromise solution to all outstanding issues.

I have on my list of speakers inscribed for today the representatives of South Africa, Germany, Romania and Peru. Before giving the floor to the speakers, I would like, with your indulgence, to make a few opening remarks on my assumption of the presidency of the Conference.

As a member of the CD Mongolia attaches great importance to the work of the Conference and makes its efforts to contribute to the cause of disarmament. Clear evidence of our commitment to disarmament and arms limitation is the fact that Mongolia became the twenty-first State which deposited the instrument of ratification of the chemical weapons Convention.

The Conference on Disarmament is passing through a very important epoch in its history. After successful conclusion of the chemical weapons Convention the CD is now conducting multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a priority task of the Conference.

The last two parts of the 1995 CD session are taking place in the aftermath of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. In this connection I would like to note the significance of the decision to extend indefinitely the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. My Government considers the NPT as a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. The Treaty has

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played and continues to play an important role in preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is also important that States parties to the NPT, especially nuclear-weapon States, reiterated the ultimate goals of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and committed themselves to strengthening the Treaty review process.

The results of the NPT Review and Extension Conference have a direct bearing on the work of the CD as well as on its agenda. The document "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" which was unanimously adopted by the Conference sets the target date for completion of the CTBT not later than 1996.

Since the start of this year's session we have made some important progress in the CTBT negotiations. However, a number of substantive issues have remained unsolved. Issues critically important for the future of the CTBT, including scope, entry into force, withdrawal, verification and institutional issues should be resolved and political decisions should be taken for achieving quick progress in the negotiations. Therefore, during the second part of the CD session some delegations have expressed their concern over the slow pace of our negotiations and have appealed for the intensification of efforts with a view to concluding the CTBT by the above target date.

Another important outcome of the Review and Extension Conference is the objective on the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes.

The "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" also urge the nuclear-weapon States, pending the entry into force of a CTBT, to exercise utmost restraint on nuclear testing. In this connection, we fully share the concerns and disappointment expressed by many delegations in the CD at the recent decision and action by some nuclear-weapon States with regard to nuclear testing. We urge that all nuclear-weapon States should continue to refrain from testing in order to maintain the present political climate favourable to the CTBT negotiations.

The NPT's underlying purpose will be served if the non-nuclear-weapon States are adequately assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In this respect Security Council resolution 984 of 11 April 1995 on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and the unilateral statements of nuclear-weapon States are welcome developments auguring well for the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. Such arrangements, in our opinion, should cover not only non-nuclear-weapon States but also nuclear-weapon-free zones. It is of crucial importance for Mongolia, which has declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Mongolia, like many others, is of the view that the only effective way to provide assurances is to conclude a multilateral agreement of a legally binding character.

(The President)

Another important issue of political significance which needs to be solved without delay is the expansion of the CD. My delegation considers that the legitimate request of many countries for membership in the CD should be seriously considered in the CD in light of the present political realities.

In conclusion, let me say a few words on the organizational matters of the CD work. As you are aware, I have already undertaken a number of consultations both at the bilateral level and with group coordinators in order to seek ways of overcoming the difficulties which still beset us concerning the outstanding issues relating to the agenda and organization of work for this session. It is my intention to intensify my efforts in order to try to bring about a compromise solution which would enable the Conference to deal with all items on its agenda. I would appeal to delegations to display the necessary degree of flexibility to make this possible.

This concludes my opening remarks. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of South Africa, Ambassador Selebi.

Mr. SELEBI (South Africa): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you on the assumption of the important office of President of the Conference on Disarmament. I am particularly pleased that you are presiding over the Conference during my first address before it. I would also like to express my appreciation and that of my delegation to your predecessors for the very creditable way in which they guided the work of the Conference during the 1995 session. It was particularly pleasing for us when Ambassador Nanjira, a fellow African, filled the presidency earlier this year. As President of this Conference it will be your task to attempt to resolve several sensitive issues which have remained outstanding for many months, and I wish you the best of luck.

South Africa has been participating in the work of the Conference on Disarmament since 1992. We formally applied for membership later that same year. South Africa's interest in disarmament arises out of the Government of National Unity's commitment to a policy on non-proliferation and arms control which covers all weapons of mass destruction and which extends to our concerns about the proliferation of conventional weapons. We see our non-proliferation and arms control policy as being integral to our commitment to democracy, human rights, sustainable development, social justice and environmental protection. It was in this context that South African turned away from the edge of the nuclear weapons abyss.

The non-proliferation Treaty is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime and it forms the foundation upon which much of our work is based, including the negotiations presently being conducted in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. When the NPT was adopted 25 years ago it represented a major advance towards nuclear disarmament, committing its members to making the world a safer place. The dramatic changes brought about by the end of the cold war have created the global environment in which it is possible to realize the NPT's basic objectives. The achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty will be the attainment of one of the most important of these objectives.

(Mr. Selebi, South Africa)

At the recent Review and Extension Conference, which was held in New York during April and May, the NPT regime was reinforced by the adoption, without a vote, of the decisions on the strengthened review process and on the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". The "Principles and objectives", and especially the section dealing with nuclear disarmament, have a particular significance for the Conference on Disarmament because of the Conference's role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. The "Principles and objectives" note that nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The States parties further undertake to fulfil "with determination" the NPT's nuclear disarmament undertakings, whilst the nuclear-weapon States also reaffirm their commitment to negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. The "Principles and objectives" then go on to outline certain measures in a programme of action which are important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI of the Treaty. The programme of action which was adopted entails the completion of the negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a "cut-off" convention and the determined pursuit of nuclear and general and complete disarmament.

It is the intention that these "Principles and objectives" will be renewed at every review so as to ensure that they are dynamic and that they adapt to changing international circumstances. They should be the yardstick by which all the States parties can measure nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament achievements.

The NPT Conference was also an important landmark in our goal of achieving the universality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In this context I would like to reiterate my Foreign Minister's words when he addressed the NPT Conference during its general debate. He stated:

> "Apartheid South Africa as a part of its national security policy embarked on a nuclear weapons programme. Democratic South Africa sees its international and regional security being achieved by complete nuclear disarmament. The NPT provides us in Africa and the international community with greater security than did the nuclear weapons which we have destroyed. Southern Africa until very recently was in a state of conflict, war and destabilization and nuclear weapons were thought to be providing security. I believe that the South African experience - namely, that security is provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation - is a telling one: not only for the 'threshold' States, but also for the 'acknowledged' weapon States."

I am particularly pleased to be able to relate to the Conference certain developments concerning the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The OAU/United Nations Group of Experts, who were very ably assisted by a member of the United Nations disarmament secretariat in Geneva, Dr. Sola Ogunbanwo, completed their task of preparing a text for the Treaty during a meeting in Johannesburg at the end of May. The sixty-second meeting of the Council of

(Mr. Selebi, South Africa)

Ministers of OAU adopted the "Pelindaba Text" of the Treaty on 23 June 1995 (Pelindaba is the headquarters of South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation and the word when roughly translated means "the discussion has been completed"). The Treaty will now be forwarded to the General Assembly. Africa attaches great importance to this Treaty and we hope that its protocols on security assurances and on the prohibition of testing of nuclear devices within the zone will obtain the support of all the nuclear-weapon States. Once the Treaty has entered into force, we look forward to establishing cooperative arrangements with other nuclear-weapon-free zones in the southern hemisphere. Work should then also begin on a treaty establishing Africa as a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

My country has been observing the progress towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty with interest. We pay tribute to all those delegations which have worked so hard to produce the current rolling text, which is already a significant achievement. South Africa stands ready to implement its commitments in the international monitoring system when it is set up.

On the vexing question of the scope of the treaty, my delegation favours a simple article based on article I of the partial test-ban treaty. We do not think that a CTBT should include the concepts of peaceful nuclear explosions, safety tests or low-yield tests, all of which could be open to abuse, which could frustrate the purposes of a comprehensive test ban. South Africa sees a future CTBT as an instrument both for non-proliferation and disarmament. Both these elements must be reflected in the scope of a future comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The importance of the work being done in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the early conclusion of the CTBT negotiations was reiterated during the NPT Review and Extension Conference. In the "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" the States parties to the NPT decided without a vote that the completion by the Conference on Disarmament of the negotiations on a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty no later than 1996 is important in the full realization and effective implementation of article VI of the NPT. We must therefore constantly reinvigorate the negotiations to ensure maximum utility of the time available. It is vitally important that the "Principles and objectives" deadline should be strictly adhered to if we are to maintain the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and of the decisions taken in New York.

My delegation looks forward to the commencement of negotiations for a convention prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We would like to pay tribute to Ambassador Shannon of Canada, whose tireless efforts led to agreement on a mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on "cut-off".

I would like to take this opportunity of outlining some of our interest in the proposed convention and some preliminary thoughts on what it might entail.

(Mr. Selepi, South Africa)

South Africa was probably one of the first States at the end of the cold war to cease production of fissile materials for weapons purposes when operations at its pilot enrichment plant were terminated early in 1990. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) had been produced at the plant for use as fuel in the production of isotopes as well as for the nuclear deterrent devices. The very same facility therefore produced highly enriched uranium for both peaceful and military purposes, clearly illustrating the difficulties we can expect in verifying a "cut-off" convention. The plant has been regularly inspected by IAEA since November 1991 after South Africa acceded to the NPT and implemented a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency.

In our opinion, the purpose of a cut-off convention would be to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and to provide a prohibition on the production of nuclear material for weapons purposes through a binding legal commitment. The main undertakings in a "cut-off" convention would be: to terminate operations and to refrain from any further production of fissile materials intended for explosive devices; to refrain from providing assistance to any other State to produce fissile materials for proscribed purposes; and to accept non-discriminatory international safeguards to verify these undertakings.

During the General Assembly last year a significant new resolution was adopted by consensus on the expansion of the membership of the Conference on Disarmament (resolution 49/77 B). That resolution recalled the report of the Special Coordinator for membership designated by the Conference, Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia, and the subsequent statement made by the Special Coordinator on 26 August 1993, recommending a dynamic solution to the question of membership. The Conference was also urged by the General Assembly to make every effort to reach a solution resulting, by the beginning of this year, in a significant expansion of its composition, which would then include at least 60 countries.

South Africa is concerned that very little attention has this year been focused on the problem of expansion of the Conference, notwithstanding resolution 49/77 B. With the passage of time the reasons for a change in composition of the Conference become ever more striking and the Conference's lack of progress in this regard more conspicuous. The Conference will no doubt be aware that the adoption of resolution 49/77 B without a vote at the General Assembly was a source of great hope not only to my delegation but also to many others represented here. The lack of progress on this issue will undoubtedly cast a shadow over how we view the overall work which has been done in the CD this year. It is also my hope that the excellent coordination and cooperation which was prevalent between the non-members of the CD will continue during the General Assembly as it did last year.

In conclusion, I would like to address the matter of the programme of work of the Conference on Disarmament, which has not progressed since the "Presidential statement on the agenda and organization of work for the 1995 session of the Conference on Disarmament", despite the notable accomplishments in the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the agreement of a mandate for an ad hoc committee on "cut-off". As an observer South Africa is not

(Mr. Selebi, South Africa)

participating in the Presidential consultations on this matter. We would, however, encourage the members to be flexible in their deliberations so as to move the work of the CD forward. Such flexibility would allow us, even at this late stage, to address the important issues which appear on the Conference's agenda. Of particular importance to South Africa are the matters of nuclear disarmament, the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons and transparency in armaments.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of South Africa for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of Germany, Ambassador Hoffmann.

Mr. HOFFMANN (Germany): Mr. President, I would like to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament. I pledge the fullest cooperation of my delegation to your endeavours to advance the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I also avail myself of this opportunity to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador de Icaza of Mexico, for his untiring and genuine efforts to sort out, albeit in vain, the existing stalemate hamstringing the work of the Conference on Disarmament. I hope that under your able guidance we can break this stalemate in the forthcoming weeks. Let me also welcome wholeheartedly Ambassador Ghose of India and Ambassador Selebi of South Africa, who will add to our workforce here, and they are very welcome to Geneva.

Indeed, we have to recognize the CD's failure to re-establish last year's ad hoc committees except the Ad Hoc Committee on CTBT negotiations. Various issues of nuclear disarmament have been on the agenda of the CD since its very beginning. As recognized by 178 States in their decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted by consensus in New York this year, a multilaterally negotiated CTBT and a cut-off convention are measures to realize nuclear disarmament. We hold that these principles and objectives, which Ambassador Selebi also mentioned, are a political document of great importance and we are fully committed to its contents. Therefore, the CD should immediately start the work of the ad hoc committee on cut-off already established.

It is simply beyond my understanding why we should not work on nuclear disarmament by negotiating a cut-off convention under agenda item 2 of the CD agenda, entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". A cut-off convention would reinforce the role of the CD as the sole negotiating body for global disarmament in the coming years. We should bear in mind that we are asked by the United Nations General Assembly and the NPT Review and Extension Conference to negotiate a cut-off convention. We have already agreed to the mandate of an ad hoc committee and its establishment. If some delegations want to block cut-off negotiations by blocking the appointment of an ad hoc committee chairman because they prefer speaking about nuclear disarmament in general terms rather than implementing it in concrete terms, this will be a message not easily understood by the international community.

(Mr. Hoffmann, Germany)

I would like to make some observations regarding conventional disarmament. We failed to re-establish an ad hoc committee on transparency in armaments, the only ad hoc committee dealing inter alia with conventional armament. The outer world will not be interested in the internal quarrels of the CD. What will matter remains the message that conventional disarmament or control of conventional armament are not deemed worthwhile being dealt with by the CD as a forum negotiating multilateral disarmament conventions. Without neglecting the importance of nuclear disarmament the CD does not live up to the expectations of the international community when disregarding the vast majority of weapons provided by so-called conventional weapons which have been causing numerous regional conflicts and misery to the civilian population.

Let me finally touch upon the ongoing CTBT negotiations and their relation to nuclear test moratoria. In doing so I refer to a speech given by Chancellor Kohl to the German Parliament on 13 July of this year. The sovereign decision of our close partner France to conduct nuclear-weapon tests in the Pacific has caused concern in Germany and in other countries. The Federal Government has been advocating the conclusion of a verifiable and comprehensive test-ban treaty for a long time. The Federal Government has always held the view that nuclear test moratoria are most important for successful negotiations in Geneva. The commitment of the Federal Government in favour of a general test ban is part of its efforts towards worldwide nuclear disarmament, a goal the Federal Government has always been advocating. The decision of the States parties to extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons indefinitely was an important step in this regard. In addition to the indefinite extension of this treaty it was agreed in New York to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996. We hope this goal can be attained. As we all know, an explicit statement to abandon nuclear-weapon tests right now could not be achieved in New York. Nevertheless, the decision taken in New York regarding the date of conclusion of the CTBT negotiations remains an important breakthrough. For the first time all nuclear-weapons States including France have committed themselves to the deadline 1996 to conclude a CTBT. The German delegation will continue to work as constructively as possible to bring about the conclusion of the Geneva nuclear-test-ban negotiations at the latest in 1996.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Germany for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to Ambassador Neagu of Romania.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): Mr. President, allow me to congratulate you, the distinguished representative of Mongolia, on your assumption to the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament and to pledge my delegation's full support in your discharging the important duties ahead of you, and, in fact, ahead of all of us in the Conference. I also avail myself of this opportunity to pay tribute to your immediate predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, for his arduous, sincere and indeed skilful efforts to find solutions to the pending problems of organizing our work in the Conference. The appreciation of my delegation goes also to the Ambassadors of Italy, Japan and Kenya, who assured with competence and devotion the presidency of the CD this year. At the same time, let me extend a cordial welcome to all our distinguished

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

colleagues, the Ambassadors of Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan, Mexico, India and South Africa, who recently joined us in the CD and I am sure will bring a new, fresh impetus in our deliberations.

I have asked for the floor in order to present some comments and argue in favour of re-launching a more concrete, business-like debate on transparency in armaments (TIA), part and parcel of disarmament and international security, which now challenges the international environment most acutely and dramatically.

It is a widely recognized reality that all the conflicts erupted on the Earth during the last five decades were exclusively fuelled by the proliferation and build-up of conventional weapons. Since World War II millions of lives have been taken away due to conventional, not mass-destruction weapons. The large-scale use of conventional armaments both in internal and international conflicts has also generated economic, social and ethnic disruptions of profoundly negative impact for normal life. The tragedy which continues unabated today in former Yugoslavia, as well as in other parts of the world is a permanent reminder of such horrendous consequences.

Let me recall in this context the growing problem generated by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel land-mines, a category of conventional weapons which inter alia cause enormous casualties, slow down or prevent the return of refugees and affect the United Nations humanitarian and peace-keeping operations. Another facet of the issue is the illicit traffic in small arms, which involves in fact massive quantities of such arms. The growth in the illicit arms trade, as indicated by the United Nations Secretary-General before the CD itself on 6 July 1995, constitutes a source of particular concern, a most disturbing and dangerous phenomenon especially for the internal situation, for the respect of human rights in the affected States.

Moreover, the balance of forces established in time or by international agreements in various sensitive regions can be undermined through preferential conventional arms transfer policies.

Recent events as well as new risks emanating from the post-cold-war political environment demand responsible and timely action from us all.

The adoption more than three years ago by the United Nations of resolution 46/36 L constituted a unique first step in the process for greater transparency in armaments. It represented a significant departure from past practices since for the first time the United Nations embarked upon an action-oriented endeavour by establishing a United Nations Register of Conventional Arms with a built in mechanism for review and expansion of transparency in armaments. As recognized in United Nations General Assembly resolution 49/75 G, the establishment of the Register constitutes an important step forward in the promotion of transparency in military matters and a viable instrument capable of attracting the widest possible participation.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

The issue of transparency in armaments is indeed rather complex and sensitive because it relates directly to the security of States in a troubled, uncertain period, in which various regions of the world are affected by suspicion, instability and mistrust. However, the common awareness of risks and challenges should not inhibit but stimulate our determination for cooperation. Therefore, we firmly believe that there is no valid reason for evading the topic. On the contrary, it is our conviction that the problem of transparency in armaments needs urgent and close consideration.

Having in view its complexity, probably the approach should be gradual, starting with conceptual aspects and advancing step by step towards more action-oriented measures.

Taking into account these basic requirements Romania has submitted to the CD a proposal for a "Code of conduct for the international transfers of conventional arms", now document CD/1257 of 17 May 1994. We have also welcomed similar ideas put forward by Australia, Ireland and New Zealand. Essentially, the idea of a code of conduct is intended to bring about restraint and responsibility in conventional arms transfers. It also envisages the endurance of equal and undiminished security of States at the lowest levels of armaments. Basic principles of conduct, criteria to be followed in considering arms transfers or for avoiding transfers, respectively, as well as an appropriate mechanism of data-sharing and consultations should be equally taken into account when discussing such an international instrument. Obviously, the code of conduct should be open to all States in order to meet fully its commendable goals.

Now at the demise of the cold war there is a great opportunity to address concretely the problem of conventional arms build-ups. We share the view that however legitimate the preoccupations over nuclear disarmament may be, as has also been noted by the distinguished Ambassador of Germany today, nothing can justify the continued failure to address conventional weapons. Transparency in armaments is a relatively new item on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, which Romania regards as the most appropriate forum able to play an essential role in the overall process. I am fully confident that the Conference will find resources to overcome procedural inconveniences and to embrace soon the path of concrete negotiations on this most acute issue of international security and disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I would not like to give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador Urrutia.

Mr. URRUTIA (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. President, allow me first of all to convey to you my delegation's congratulations on seeing you in the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament at the beginning of this third and last session for 1995. I should also like to extend to you our full cooperation and support in the discharge of your duties. Likewise we should like to express our congratulations to your predecessor, Ambassador de Icaza

(Mr. Urrutia, Peru)

of Mexico, on the magnificent way in which he guided our work. My delegation would also like to welcome the new Ambassadors of India and South Africa who have joined the work of the Conference today.

My delegation has asked for the floor to inform the Conference on Disarmament that on 20 July Peru deposited with the United Nations Secretariat in New York the instrument of ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, thus becoming the thirty-second State party. The full accession of our country to this international convention is further proof of Peru's peaceable and responsible approach and its ongoing commitment to the efforts of the international community to make progress in the field of disarmament, and, in this specific case, in eradicating weapons of mass destruction.

The successful conclusion of negotiations on the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons in September 1992 and, months later, the signing ceremony in Paris in January 1993, marked the beginning of a new stage in the implementation of a multilateral disarmament agreement which encompasses the elimination of a whole category of weapons under international control universally applied. Two years later, we continue to face the urgent and priority task of ensuring that the Convention enters into force. We believe that we States should shoulder the commitment to strive and do everything within our power to realize this task which the international community demands.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Peru for his important statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of India.

Ms. GHOSE (India): Mr. President, since this is the first time that I am taking the floor under your presidency, I would like at the outset to congratulate you on your assumption of this important office at a crucial stage of our work in the CD. My delegation is particularly glad to see you in the Chair because of the close links between our countries. I would also like to avail of this opportunity to thank all the colleagues, including you, Mr. President, who have welcomed me here today. I look forward to working closely with all members and observers of the CD in our common endeavour.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of India for her statement and for the kind words addressed to me. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? I see none.

As you are aware, I have already undertaken a number of consultations both at the bilateral level and with group coordinators in order to seek ways of overcoming the difficulties which still beset us concerning the outstanding issues relating to the agenda and organization of work for this session. It is my intention to intensify my efforts in order to try to bring about a

(The President)

compromise solution which would enable the Conference to deal adequately with all items on its agenda. I would appeal to delegations to display the necessary degree of flexibility to make this possible.

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It is, as usual, tentative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I suggest that the Conference adopts it?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 10 August 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.10 a.m.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.713
10 August 1995

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on
Thursday, 10 August 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Shirchinjavyn Yumjav (Mongolia)

GE.95-63435 (E)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 713th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers the representative of Pakistan, who will speak in his capacity as coordinator of the Group of 21, as well as the representatives of France and Australia. I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Akram.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. President, before I turn to the statement that I have been entrusted to make as the Coordinator of the Group of 21, let me take this opportunity to express to you my warmest felicitations on your assumption of the presidency of this Conference. We are confident that you will be able to make a signal contribution to our work at this very critical juncture in the affairs of the Conference on Disarmament. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, for the valiant efforts that he made in trying to resolve the problems being faced by the Conference on Disarmament with regard to the organization of its work. He tried heroically and he almost succeeded, and we hope that his work will continue to contribute to the eventual success of our Conference. Finally, it is also my pleasure to express a warm welcome to the new Ambassador of India, Ambassador Arundhati Ghose, who, we are confident, will make an outstanding contribution to the work of this Conference.

I have been entrusted by the Group of 21 to make the following statement on the draft resolution circulated by Argentina in the United Nations Security Council, document S/1995/567.

The G-21 takes note of the draft resolution circulated to members of the Security Council regarding the proposed role for the Security Council on the question of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The G-21 notes with concern that the draft resolution is silent on the vertical proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, on nuclear disarmament and on the continued existence and retention of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon States. In the Group's view, the huge nuclear-weapons stockpiles in the possession of the nuclear-weapons States, continuing qualitative improvements to nuclear-weapons systems and the development and production of new nuclear weapons must constitute a priority in the field of multilateral disarmament since these represent a grave danger to international peace and security. It is this issue which should be of special concern to the Security Council, in view of the overwhelming demand for the elimination of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, recognized and voiced in various United Nations General Assembly resolutions.

The Group believes that non-proliferation in all its aspects can be best promoted through the adoption and implementation of a legally binding, multilaterally negotiated treaty for elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. It is high time that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) commenced negotiations on such a treaty. This would be consistent with the biological and chemical weapons conventions which aim to eliminate respective categories of weapons of mass destruction entirely.

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

Any deviation from the role envisaged for the Security Council under the United Nations Charter or in certain circumstances under multilateral treaties on non-proliferation and disarmament would undermine the provisions of these treaties and conventions, including the inherent mechanisms for securing redress for the violations of their provisions. It would also call into question the value of painstaking multilateral negotiations on disarmament and arms control treaties in the Conference on Disarmament.

In this context, the Group reiterates its position that the Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament issues. Circumventing the Conference on Disarmament or undermining the provisions of the existing treaties will seriously prejudice the ongoing negotiations in the CD on the CTBT and other issues.

I would request that this statement may be circulated as an official document of the Conference.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words addressed to me. I now give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Errera.

Mr. ERRERA (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, first of all I should like to welcome your accession to the office of President of our Conference at a particularly critical time in our work. It goes without saying that you may rely on the full support of my delegation. I would also like to pay tribute to your predecessor, the Ambassador of Mexico, for the talent, persistence and courage with which he led our deliberations. Finally, I would like to welcome our new colleagues, the Ambassador of South Africa, the Ambassador of India and the Ambassador of Peru.

On 13 June 1995, when the President of the Republic announced the resumption of a final series of nuclear tests, he made a solemn commitment that France would sign the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the autumn of 1996. This is the main goal. Let us not lose sight of it. It means firstly, that we are firmly looking to a halt to nuclear testing in the very near future - before the end of May 1996 as far as we are concerned, before the end of 1996 for all countries. We must honour the commitment which, like all the States parties to the NPT, we assumed in New York on 11 May 1995 in adopting the "Declaration on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". This applies above all to the five nuclear-weapon States, which must shoulder their responsibilities.

It also means that the cessation of nuclear testing that we contemplate will be final. This is why France expressed clear support for a treaty of unlimited duration on 29 June 1995.

Lastly, it means that the future treaty will provide for a comprehensive ban on testing. The President of the Republic made this very clear on 14 July.

(Mr. Errera, France)

This is the framework within which we will now be compelled, like the other nuclear Powers, to ensure the safety and the reliability of our weapons. This means that the French nuclear forces will continue to rely on the same doctrine of deterrence, the same concept of strict sufficiency and thus the same weapon systems. To put it clearly, France has no intention of designing new types of weapons, or increasing the number or power of existing weapons, or developing miniaturized weapons, or modifying the role of nuclear weapons in our defence doctrine. It also means that it cannot be claimed, as we sometimes hear, that the resumption of French nuclear testing would harm our negotiations. The opposite is true. France is determined to spare no effort to ensure that the objective of the signature of a comprehensive test-ban treaty next autumn can be reached. The President of the Republic is committed to it. It will be done.

In order to achieve this goal, the negotiations must take a new course. There is an urgent need for the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban to fulfil the mandate that was assigned to it: the conclusion of a universal and internationally verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In concrete terms this means that in the coming weeks agreement should be reached on a number of crucial points. Firstly, with regard to the verification regime, it is time to formalize the broad agreement on the components of the international monitoring system and turn to the best possible account the remarkable work accomplished under the guidance of Dr. Peter Marshall over the past 18 months. France will in particular seek to ensure that, without claiming to be perfect, the regime to be established is effective and makes the best possible use of the means available, and that its constraints are applied in an equitable manner. As regards the architecture of the future organization entrusted with the implementation of the treaty, now that the outlines of the verification regime appear more clearly, here too the time has come to decide among the various options. Finally, as for the very heart of the future treaty - the scope of the ban - the President of the Republic has expressed France's resolve to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The proposal to prohibit "any nuclear-weapon test or any other nuclear explosion" corresponds to this aim. France has decided to adopt this formulation.

Since the beginning of these negotiations France has always stated in a straightforward manner the constraints to which it was subject, its responsibilities and its objectives. We have always unambiguously held that the treaty we are negotiating would be a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests and not a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. We have never concealed that our active involvement in these negotiations was compatible with a possible resumption of our testing. From the outset, when we took this decision, we set forth with the utmost transparency the reasons for which we were resuming these tests. Likewise, everyone knows that in entering these negotiations we accepted the prospect of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Today no one should doubt our determination to honour our commitment. Everyone should be convinced of France's resolve to move the negotiations forward. This is ultimately what the international community expects from us.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, Ambassador Starr.

Mr. STARR (Australia): Mr. President, allow me also to congratulate you on your assumption of this position and assure you of the cooperation of my delegation in the difficult task ahead of us. I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues.

I asked for the floor today to make a statement on the acceleration of the negotiations and the importance of this Conference adhering to the strong expectations of our concluding the CTBT negotiations in 1996.

In a statement today in Australia, the Prime Minister of Australia said that an international agreement to a binding and genuinely comprehensive CTBT no later than 1996 is a central policy aim of the Australian Government. Such an agreement would be a major boost to international security and to our goal of the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. In this context, I can welcome the positive elements in the statement by the Ambassador of France. I must reiterate, however, Australia's firm opposition to nuclear testing. We have expressed firm opposition in this body to continued testing by China. We have opposed the French decision to resume testing. We press for a reversal of those policies and for an immediate end to testing and the maintenance of moratoriums while a CTBT is negotiated and brought into force.

The Ambassador of France said that we are definitely facing a halt to nuclear testing. My delegation believes that the only way to ensure that that is the case is by the earliest possible conclusion of a test-ban treaty, and in that regard I would like to turn to the statement that I had prepared for today.

As we are all well aware, the firm expectation of the international community, expressed earlier this year, is that the CTBT should be concluded as soon as possible, but no later than 1996. This was in itself a welcome and considerable advance in precision on late 1994 consensus language which could only muster sufficient enthusiasm for a conclusion "without delay", and I quote the 1994 resolution.

As has been recognized since then, however, the 1996 target is of itself not sufficiently precise as a guide to achievement. Fortunately, we already have significant statements pointing in the direction of greater precision, in recognition of the realities of next year's international calendar. In this context, Australia believes the commitment of President Chirac of France to sign a CTBT by the northern autumn has been particularly important. To add further precision, it is Australia's firm view that our goal should be signature of the CTBT before the fifty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Without doubt, international endorsement of a CTBT text as one of the final acts of the historic fiftieth session of the General Assembly would be a powerful symbol of our collective determination to [illegible] the nuclear

(Mr. Starr, Australia

shadow under which the United Nations itself was created, and of our determination to achieve the safer world envisaged when we decided on the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty.

But stated commitment to a target date, even combined with steady work in the Conference, will not ensure the achievement of our objective, and in making this comment let me say I have no intention of detracting from the highly commendable work of our chairmen who are putting forward every effort to achieve results. Clearly, however, a structured process and a thorough awareness of steps necessary to conclude our negotiations are required if we are to meet the target. We cannot rely on ritual acknowledgement of a date and some miracle of osmosis to bring the negotiations to fruition, though I fear we often seem to work under that delusion.

Working back then from the target date of signature of the CTBT by UNGA51, it quickly becomes evident that our negotiations in Geneva will have to be concluded by mid-1996 to allow sufficient time for resumed consideration by UNGA50, as well as preparations for the signing ceremony as soon as possible thereafter. On the basis of experience with the chemical weapons Convention, 10-12 weeks will be needed for these steps.

Conclusion of the negotiations by mid-1996 presumes, in turn, that from the start of our 1996 session the CTBT negotiations must move decisively into an end-game phase. This has immediate implications for delegations around this table, since the remaining six weeks of the 1995 session will be crucial in preparing for this last phase of the negotiations. In Australia's view, and obviously in the view of the delegation of France, there is a series of issues which form prerequisites for an end-game and thus should comprise the focus of our efforts for the remainder of this session.

Obviously convergence on scope is a fundamental requirement if we are to reach a conclusion to the negotiations in line with our commitments. The range of views on this issue is now in many cases a matter of public record. Australia sees the focus of the CTBT as to ban nuclear explosions. We see the CTBT as an essential and urgent component in a series of arms control measures designed to move towards the ultimate goal of universal nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Accordingly, I have to say that we still believe some delegations are advocating an over-extension of the scope of the treaty through an attempt, that is not feasible in our view, to cover wide-ranging nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation goals; other reported approaches, by contrast, would have the effect of undermining the concept of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

It is not credible for us to talk in terms of a serious effort to discharge the international negotiating responsibilities of this forum by 1996 if we are unable to show significant progress towards consensus on clear and simple scope language. Australia's working paper 222, which we note attracts increasing support, was designed to meet, in the most streamlined and unambiguous manner possible, the precise mandate of the nuclear test ban Ad Hoc Committee.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

We urge all delegations, which have not yet been able to join in endorsing such a formulation, to redouble efforts in this regard before the end of this session, and we urge the nuclear-weapon States in particular to contribute to the elaboration of an agreement on scope which is consistent with, and moreover reinforces the objective of a comprehensive ban. In this context, the statement by the Ambassador of France has obvious and immediate relevance.

It I might turn next to verification, which we too believe is a prerequisite area, convergence on key verification issues is essential in this final part of the 1995 session. We must find orderly and efficient ways of defining that technical detail which we decide must be reflected in the treaty and its protocol, while identifying lower-level detail which should fall to a preparatory commission to resolve.

There is much still to be done in verification in order to bring this section of the treaty text up to the same level of development as we now have for legal and institutional issues. We are well on the way to achieving this however, and the improvements to the verification text resulting from the second part of the session have been appreciable. We welcome the decision of the Ad Hoc Committee to allocate additional negotiating time in the third part of the session to verification.

Of course all final technical details do not need to be agreed this year but my delegation considers it will be necessary by January 1996 to have a clear convergence, reflected in treaty text, on: firstly, the international monitoring system as a concept, and its component elements (including agreement on the major aspects of IMS architecture, and on the nature of data-processing by the international data centre); then funding of the organization (in particular, funding of the monitoring system and verification activities); and, finally, a single concept for the development of on-site inspection.

There are obvious interrelationships here, particularly in the work on the monitoring system. Agreement on funding arrangements and on the IMS data-processing concept will clearly make final agreement on IMS architecture much easier to achieve. In this context, I wish to acknowledge the highly significant flexibility shown yesterday by the United States on funding issues which we believe will significantly aid delegations in coming to concrete agreement on IMS architecture in the next fortnight.

Without significant progress here - both conceptually and in text - it would be exceedingly difficult to convince the international community that we are making a serious effort to bring home the treaty in line with commitments and expectations. On a practical level, it would also be difficult to launch a productive and credible end-game in January 1996 if so many loose threads remain affecting verification issues. Welcome movement on funding will be a big step forward.

(Mr. Starr, Australia)

A third prerequisite in our view for the end-game phase is further streamlining of the, as yet, heavily bracketed rolling text. By necessity, this will involve deletion of aspects which are found to be duplicative, or otherwise extraneous. In this context, Australia continues to see no place in the treaty for provisions on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions or on security assurances for States parties. In the case of the first issue - PNEs - our concerns were set out in detail in my plenary statement in June. In the case of security assurances, while supportive of continuing international attention to that issue we do not believe that a Committee mandated specifically to draft a comprehensive test ban treaty is the appropriate place in which to address it.

Our fourth candidate issue for urgent attention is that of organization. Some delegations have argued up until now that discussion of the relationship between the organization and other international institutions was premature and largely dependent on progress in Working Group 1. While this argument may have held some weight in the past, it is in our view no longer valid. We now have agreement on the basic elements of the verification system, which should enable a decision at least on the **principle** of the relationship. We should now move promptly to examine its technical and financial aspects.

For Australia's part, we continue to believe that the CTBT organization should be co-located with, but independent from the International Atomic Energy Agency. This would enable savings to be derived in the start-up and running costs of the organization, in the area of accommodation, and in the general administration of the technical secretariat which could be provided by IAEA on a "user pays" basis. Common servicing should not, in our view, be extended to the technical aspects of verification, although where relevant IAEA technical expertise were identified, it could be utilized by the CTBT organization on a contractual basis as the need arose.

The logical consequence of our position is that Australia supports, in principle, Austria's offer to host the seat of the CTBT organization in Vienna. I suggest we now need detail from Austria about its offer, in particular, confirmation that a CTBT organization based in Vienna will have access to international telecommunications tariffs equal to the best available in the world, in order that transmission of large amounts of verification data be cost-effective. We look forward to early discussions with Austrian representatives.

A considerable degree of convergence on the above issues represents, in my delegation's view, the minimum necessary to facilitate the

Mr. Starr, Australia

(The President)

The secretariat has circulated, at my request, a timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies for next week. The timetable was prepared in consultation with the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It is, as usual, tentative and subject to change if necessary. On this understanding, may I suggest that the Conference adopts it?

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 17 August 1995 at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.